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A. Ownership and Boundary Disputes
Proof of title by adverse possession' received considerable attention dur-
ing the 1979 survey period.2 Possession, use, and occupancy of land by a
tenant can form the basis of a claim of limitation title by the landlord, but
only when the leased premises includes the land in controversy.3 In King v.
Inwood North Associates4 the court held that when a landlord and tenant
understand that the tenant will hold certain land under the lease, the ten-
ant's occupancy of such land will constitute the landlord's possession, even
though the land is not covered by the legal description in the lease.'
Generally, when one enters into possession of land under a deed, that
* B.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Heath & Knippa,
Houston, Texas.
1. Texas has several statutes that provide for the vesting of title in the adverse claim-
ant. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5507, 5509, 5510, 5518, 5519, 5519a (Vernon 1958 &
Supp. 1978-79). For a general discussion of the Texas adverse possession statutes, see Heath
& Bentley, Real Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 27, 29 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Heath & Bentley (1978)].
2. The Board of Editors of the Journal has designated October 17, 1978, as the end of
the 1979 survey period for purposes of this Article. This period includes cases reported in
the South Western Reporter to 570 S.W.2d 250. A few noteworthy cases reported subsequent
to that date, however, are discussed.
3. A tenant is deemed to have possession only to the extent of the tenant's right to
possession under the terms of the lease agreement. Williams v. Fuerstenberg, 23 S.W.2d 305
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, judgmt adopted); Niendorffv. Wood, 149 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1941, writ ref'd).
4. 563 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1978, no writ).
5. See Sanders v. Worthington, 382 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. 1964). The court in the King
case also approved the trial court's submission of a special issue that contained all of the
elements necessary to the establishment of title by peaceable and adverse possession under
the ten-year statute, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958). 563 S.W.2d at 313.
The court further held that the fact that the landlord was unaware of the exact location of
the boundary line and mistakenly believed that the boundaries included the land in contro-
versy did not defeat the claim of adverse possession, citing Calfee v. Duke, 544 S.W.2d 640
(Tex. 1976), a case discussed in Heath & Bentley, Real Property, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 27, 29 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Heath & Bentley (1977)]. 563 S.W.2d at
313. For two recent cases exemplifying the problems of one cotenant claiming adversely
against other cotenants, see Williams v. Williams, 559 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco




possession is referable to the deed and is presumed to be in conformity
with its terms.6 In Cunningham v. Ott7 the court held that the incidental
enclosure of land caused by the straightening of a fence and the occasional
grazing of cattle on the disputed tract did not amount to such adverse and
hostile possession as to overcome the presumption that the possession was
referable to the deed of the adverse claimant.' In Crowley v. Larkin9 the
adverse claimants maintained a fence for approximately thirty years as the
line of demarcation between their land and the lands of others, although
the fence line was over forty-three feet beyond the record boundary line of
the adverse claimants' land. In addition, tenants of the adverse claimants
had grazed cattle on the land inside the fence for over twenty years. The
jury found that the adverse claimants had held peaceable and adverse pos-
session of the land in question for over ten years prior to the filing of the
suit, and the court of civil appeals affirmed this decision.' °
Two important cases involving questions of damage to adjoining land
were decided during the survey period. In FriendswoodDevelopment Co. v.
Smith-Southwest Industries" the trial court followed the common law rule
that a landowner has the right to withdraw ground water to any extent
"unless he does it maliciously."' 2 The court of civil appeals, however,
ruled that although Texas follows the "English" rule of absolute owner-
ship, this rule does not sanction negligent conduct by the landowner in the
manner in which he produces the water or the maintenance of a nui-
sance.' 3 The Texas Supreme Court struck a compromise by holding that
in the instant case the traditional common law rule would be applied,' 4 but
with regard to future subsidence cases, the court would apply the law of
negligence in addition to the rule of willful waste and malicious injury. In
the second case involving damage to adjoining land, Burris v. Krooss, 5 the
claim was that the defendant had negligently failed to learn the location of
6. Therefore, in order for a vendee to acquire title by adverse possession to adjoining
land outside of that stated in the deed, the vendee must have actual possession of the land of
such a character as will give notice of an exclusive and adverse claim to the land. Cunning-
ham v. Ott, 564 S.W.2d 413, 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ) (citing Harmon v.
Overton Ref. Co., 130 Tex. 365, 109 S.W.2d 457 (1937)).
7. 564 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
8. The court noted that outside of the cattle grazing on the disputed tract no evidence
was present that would have given appellants notice that the appellees were holding the tract
in open, hostile, and adverse possession. Id. at 415.
9. 563 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
10. The record owner contended that the adverse claimants had occupied the land by
agreement with adjacent owners; however, the court of civil appeals noted that the evidence
showed that the record owner had acquiesced in the fence line as the boundary until shortly
before the suit was filed. Id. at 298.
11. 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978).
12. Id. at 25 (citing Acton v. Blundell, 12 Meeson & Welsby 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223
(1843)). This is the so-called "English rule." See also City of Corpus Christi v. City of
Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 292, 276 S.W.2d 798, 801 (1955).
13. 546 S.W.2d 890, 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977); see Heath & Bent-
ley (1978), supra note 1, at 39-40.
14. Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of civil appeals
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 576 S.W.2d at 30-31.
15. 563 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, no writ).
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the boundary before cutting shade trees located on the plaintiffs property.
The court held that a landowner owes a duty to an adjoining landowner to
ascertain the location of the boundary of the adjoining land with diligence
and care before cutting timber on the property. A failure to discharge this
duty may subject the landowner to damages. 6
Several cases reported during the survey period considered various as-
pects of trespass to try title litigation. In Scheffer v. Chron'7 at the trial
level the appellees had demanded an abstract of title from the appellants
pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 791.18 Two motions for exten-
sion of time to file the abstract had been granted,' 9 the last of which had
expired more than five years before the trial.2 ° The court of civil appeals
thus upheld the trial court's refusal to allow appellants to adopt on the day
of trial certain portions of abstracts filed by appellees and other parties.2
The appellants also contended that the trial court erred by refusing to con-
sider the res judicata effect of a prior judgment in a partition suit involving
the same land. The court held that since the appellants failed to plead res
judicata as an affirmative defense as required by rule 94,22 this defense had
been waived.23 Bell v. Hinkle24 involved questions of the jurisdiction of
the district court. The plaintiff filed a trespass to try title action seeking a
recovery of title to and possession of an undivided one-half interest in cer-
tain land and, alternatively, a right to the land as the heir at law of a
person who had allegedly died intestate. The trial court dismissed the suit,
holding that as this was a suit to determine heirship, it was without juris-
diction. The court of civil appeals, however, reversed and held that al-
though suits to determine heirship are under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the probate courts, where no administration is pending or necessary, sec-
tion 5 of the Probate Code25 does not affect the district court's jurisdiction.
Because the plaintiffs principle pleading was a trespass to try title action
and there was no evidence that the allegations were not made in good
faith,26 the court held that the district court had jurisdiction and erred in
dismissing the case.27 In Finke v. Wheatfall2 the appellees brought suit to
16. Id. at 877.
17. 560 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
18. TEX. R. Civ. P. 791.
19. Extensions were granted pursuant to TEX. R. Civ. P. 792.
20. 560 S.W.2d at 421.
21. Id.
22. TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
23. The court noted that the negligence, inadvertence, or mistake of counsel is attributa-
ble to his client, so that counsel's failure to handle the case properly does not constitute
"good cause," authorizing a new trial. 560 S.W.2d at 422. See generally Petro-Chemical
Transp., Inc. v. Carroll, 514 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1974).
24. 562 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
25. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (section 5 increased the powers
of the probate courts to enable them to dispose of estates in one proceeding.). See
Schwartzel & Wilshusen, Texas Probate Jurisdictiow" New Patches/or the Texas Probate
Code, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 372 (1976).
26. In determining the jurisdiction of the trial court, the allegations of the petition made
in good faith are determinative of the cause of action. See, e.g., Brannon v. Pacific Employ-
ers Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 289, 224 S.W.2d 466 (1949).
27. 562 S.W.2d at 38.
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set aside a judgment by which a writ of partition was issued, a receiver
appointed, and the property sold; appellees additionally filed a cross-ac-
tion in trespass to try title to establish a one-half interest in the property.
The appellees had not been served with citation or given other notice of
the partition proceeding under which the appellant acquired title to the
property, and the evidence showed that the appellant was fully aware of
the appellees' one-half interest in the property." The court of civil appeals
affirmed the trial court's judgment setting aside the writ of partition, the
receiver's deed, the sale, and the order confirming the sale; in the cross-
action, the court awarded a one-half interest in the property to the appel-
lees on the basis of a showing of superior title from a common source.3°
In Bagwell v. Lotspeich3" the plaintiffs alleged that while a deed had
been given to the defendants, the defendants had agreed to hold land in
trust for plaintiff and reconvey the property. The plaintiff sued in trespass
to try title and defendant argued that as a matter of law the outstanding
deed prevented suit in trespass to try title. The court held that the fact that
the deed had not been cancelled did not preclude the grantors from main-
taining suit in trespass to try title to subordinate the title conveyed by the
deed to a title held by the grantors by reason of an alleged agreement by
the grantees to hold the land in trust for the grantors. 32 Under general
averments of ownership, the court held, the plaintiff in a trespass to try title
suit may show whatever title he has, including equitable title, without spe-
cially pleading that title. In Trans- World Bonded Warehouses & Storage,
Inc. v. Garza33 the court held that a purchaser under an enforceable oral
contract4for the conveyance of land that had not been fully performed did
not have equitable title to the land and thus could not maintain an action
in trespass to try title because he had not fully performed his obligations
under the contract. 3
In Katz v. Rodriguez36 the court discussed the distinction between a suit
28. 565 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ granted).
29. id. at 389. The court noted that documents prepared for a party and with his au-
thorization are admissible as "admissions by adoption," citing Thornell v. Missouri State
Life Ins. Co., 249 S.W. 203 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, judgmt adopted), and Bolin Oil Co. v.
Staples, 496 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 565 S.W.2d at
391.
30. 565 S.W.2d at 392.
31. 561 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
32. Id. at 924. The court also held that the four-year limitations period provided in
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958) is not applicable to an action for the
recovery of land based on an express trust. Id. at 923.
33. 570 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
34. An oral contract may be removed from the Statute of Frauds when it has been fully
executed, or when it has been performed to the extent that the application of the Statute
would defeat its purpose. Generally, payment of the purchase price, coupled with posses-
sion and permanent and valuable improvements by the vendee with the vendor's consent,
will suffice. See Hooks v. Bridgwater, Ill Tex. 122, 229 S.W. 1114 (1921). See also Harris
v. Potts, 545 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. 1976); Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 5, at 43.
35. 570 S.W.2d at 5. The owner of equitable title to land has sufficient title to support
an action in trespass to try title. See Binford v. Snyder, 144 Tex. 134, 189 S.W.2d 471 (1945).
See also Bagwell v. Lotspeich, 561 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
36. 563 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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in trespass to try title and a suit to quiet title and held that in a suit to quiet
title, the claimant is not required to trace his title either to the sovereign or
to a common source. 37 If contractors and material suppliers file false lien
affidavits, they may be subject to a suit to remove cloud from title and for
damages for slander of title, as was the case in Adams v. Marsh.38 In a
proper case, exemplary damages may also be awarded in a suit to remove
cloud on title;39 however, as Bibby v. Preston40 demonstrates, without
proof of actual damages, there can be no award of exemplary damages.4'
In Brelsford v. Schultz4 the plaintiffs were denied partition of a tract of
land, a portion of which the defendant had conveyed to plaintiff Brelsford
in payment for legal services. 43 To establish a right to have a tract parti-
tioned, the plaintiff must prove joint ownership and an equal right to pos-
session with the other owners." In Brelsford the plaintiffs failed to
discharge this burden. The Brelsford court also reaffirmed the rule that the
mere use of the word "trustee" does not itself create a trust.45 In Stradt v.
First United Methodist Church46 the court of civil appeals held that when a
father conveyed a portion of community estate to his daughter in settle-
ment of his daughter's interest in her mother's estate, and the daughter
accepted the conveyance and went into possession, the effect of the trans-
action was a partition of the father's and daughter's respective interests in
community lands. 47 The Texas Supreme Court, however, reversed, hold-
ing that there was no evidence that the daughter intended a partition when
she accepted the conveyance. 48 In Inter-City Properties, Inc. v. Gibbs4 9 the
37. Id. at'629-30. See Dalton v. Davis, I S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, holding
approved). However, in a quiet title action, the plaintiff must prove both a superior title and
a wrongful cloud on that title created by the defendant. See McGuire v. Bond, 271 S.W.2d
508 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Note, ProceduralAspects
of Land Title Suits, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 112, 117 (1975).
38. 563 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, no writ). Also on suit to remove
cloud on title, see White v. Douglas, 569 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no
writ), and Chandler v. Drummet, 557 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977,
writ refd n.r.e.).
39. See Reaugh v. McCullum Exploration Co., 139 Tex. 485, 163 S.W.2d 620 (1942).
See also Walker v. Ruggles, 540 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no
writ) (slander of title); Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 5, at 41-42.
40. 555 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
41. See Phillips v. Wertz, 546 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
42. 564 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
43. Id. at 407.
44. Manchaca v. Martinez, 136 Tex. 139, 148 S.W.2d 391 (1941); see TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 6082 (Vernon 1970). The plaintiffs' claim in Brels/ord was found to be only
a nonpossessory equitable interest. 564 S.W.2d at 406.
45. The court, however, held that when an express trust fails, the law may imply a
resulting trust. 564 S.W.2d at 406. See generally Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note 1, at
43; Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 5, at 36.
46. 573 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. 1978).
47. 567 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont), rev'd and remanded, 573 S.W.2d 186
(Tex. 1978).
48. Conduct such as taking possession of land by a party to a parol partition may be
evidence of a partition. See Reynolds v. Mangrum, 250 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App.- East-
land 1952, no writ); Edwards v. Edwards, 52 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1932, writ
ref'd). A voluntary partition of land, however, must be based on the agreement of all parties
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court held that a written agreement among three cotenants restricting the
use and occupancy of the land and granting each cotenant a preferential
right to purchase the interests of the others in effect contracted away the
right of the cotenants to have the land partitioned." In Williams v. Wil-
iams5' the court determined that the defendant held title to the subject
property under a constructive trust and therefore the statute of limitations
would not begin to run in favor of the constructive trustee until the cestui
had notice of a repudiation of the trust or knowledge sufficient to excite
inquiry as to such repudiation."
The presumption of a lost grant which arises from long continued pos-
session of the property under a claim of title coupled with other cor-
roborating circumstances is generally a question of fact.5 3 In Howland v.
Hough,54 however, the Texas Supreme Court held that where the deeds
are so ancient 55 and the evidence virtually undisputed, a lost grant may be
presumed as a matter of law.56 The court in Howland was also faced with
the problem of resolving the fact that the disputed tract did not fall within
the literal calls of the deeds in the chain of title. Relying on William Car-
lisle & Co. v. King,5 7 the supreme court reconciled the discrepancies by
correcting obvious errors in calls and adjusting conflicting distances.
B. Restrictions on Land Use
1. Private Restrictive Covenants
There were a significant number of cases during the survey period in-
volving private deed restrictions and restrictive covenants. Schulz v. Zoel-
ler58 reaffirmed the general rule that when the owner of a tract of land
subdivides it and sells lots to separate grantees, imposing restrictions pur-
suant to a general plan of development, such restrictions may be enforced
by any grantee against any other grantee. 59 The issue in Curb v. Benson6"
with a possessory interest and cannot be the result of a unilateral decision. See, e.g., State v.
Kirkpatrick, 299 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1957, writ ref d n.r.e.).
49. 560 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ). Another par-
tition case decided during the survey period is Navarro v. Collora, 566 S.W.2d 304 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, wnt granted).
50. 560 S.W.2d at 504-05.
51. 559 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
52. Id. at 893. See, e.g., Todd v. Bruner, 365 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. 1963); Mills v. Gray,
147 Tex. 33, 210 S.W.2d 985 (1948).
53. See Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. 1964); 4 F. LANGE, LAND TITLES AND
TITLE EXAMINATION § 405 (1961).
54. 570 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. 1978).
55. Here the gap in title occurred 96 to 129 years before the suit was brought and no
direct evidence was available as to possession of the land during that gap.
56. See Page v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 381 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1964, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965). Cf. Magee v. Paul,
110 Tex. 470, 221 S.W. 254 (1920).
57. 103 Tex. 620, 133 S.W.241 (1910).
58. 568 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
59. Id. at 679; see, e.g., Curlee v. Walker, 112 Tex. 40, 244 S.W. 497 (1922); Green v.
Gerner, 289 S.W. 999 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, holding approved).
60. 564 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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was whether a "prefabricated" house that was moved onto property vio-
lated a restrictive covenant requiring that all residences be "built in place."
The Bensons' house was constructed in two sections that were moved onto
the lot, placed on the foundation, and joined together. The court held that
the words "built in place" contemplated a house constructed piece by piece
on a permanent site and that the Benson house was not "built in place."
Thus the prefabricated house was in violation of the restrictive covenant
and had to be removed.6'
One of the most common issues in deed restriction litigation is the appli-
cation of restrictions to mobile homes. The restriction in Witmer v. Mc-
Carty 62 provided that "no trailor [sic] . . . or other building of like
characteristics" could be built or moved onto any part of the subdivision.
The defendant moved a mobile home on his lot and placed it on concrete
blocks. The court held that the mobile home violated the restriction
against trailers.63 Further, the court held that these restrictions were not
waived merely because some residents of the subdivision had recreational
trailers, carports, or metal outbuildings on their property.64
In Martin v. Moore65 the court enjoined a landowner from maintaining
a fence that had been erected forward of the minimum building set-back
line contained in the restrictive covenants for the subdivision even though
the restrictions provided that a suit to enjoin a violation must be brought
prior to the completion of the construction in question. The court found
that this procedure was unreasonable since the fence construction was be-
gun on a Saturday and was completed on the ensuing Monday. The court
also rejected the contention that a two-month delay between the date the
fence construction had started and the date the suit was filed was an unrea-
sonable delay. The restrictive covenants required that all construction in
the subdivision be approved by an architectural control committee.66 The
defendant asserted that it was incumbent on the plaintiffs to plead and
prove that the architectural control committee had not approved the
fence.67 The court, however, held that the approval of the committee was
an affirmative defense that was neither pleaded nor proved by the defend-
ant and consequently was waived.68 Finally, the court held that the front
lot set-back line was applicable even though defendant's house sided on
that set-back line rather than faced it.69 It is common for restrictive cove-
nants to provide, as did the one in Martin v. Moore, that an architectural
control committee, or in some cases the developer, shall have the authority
61. Id. at 433. But see Mathis v. Wallace, 553 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1977, no writ), discussed in Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note 1, at 96.
62. 566 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
63. Id. at 104-05. See also Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1977); Heath & Bent-
ley (1978), supra note 1, at 95.
64. 566 S.W.2d at 103-04.
65. 562 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
66. Id. at 278.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 278-79.
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to approve proposed construction in the subdivision.7" Nevertheless, as
pointed out in Davis v. Huey,7 such a restriction may be unenforceable if
the particular exercise of that authority is unreasonable or not in good
faith.72
In Gunnels v. North Woodland Hills Community Association" a commu-
nity protective association won a temporary injunction requiring removal
of a citizens band radio antenna from a residence in a subdivision. The
defendants contended that the association did not have standing to bring
the action;74 the court, however, held that the association was expressly
authorized by the restrictive covenants to enforce those restrictions. More-
over, since the defendants knew that the restrictive covenants prohibited
such antennae, and removal would not be unduly burdensome, the court
held that requiring removal pending final trial was proper in view of the
harm that would result to the other residents by allowing the antenna to
remain.75 In Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Association76 the
trial court permanently enjoined the defendants from parking motor vehi-
cles overnight on driveways leading to their garages in violation of a sub-
division rule that prohibited such action. The court of appeals affirmed
the injunction insofar as the defendants were enjoined from the common
area driveways, but reformed the injunction to exclude that part of the
driveway owned by the defendants in fee simple. In Wilson v. Golman7 7
the court held that the operation of a convenience store that sold beer,
wine, snack foods, and other nonfood items was not in violation of a
deed restriction prohibiting the operation of a "liquor store." 79
The effect of a conflict between a deed restriction and a zoning ordi-
70. See generally Annot. 40 A.L.R.3d 864 (1971) (validity and construction of restrictive
covenant requiring consent to construction on lot).
71. 571 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1978).
72. See Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, 34 Cal. 2d 442, 211 P.2d 302 (1949). No Texas
court has ruled directly on this issue, although the supreme court's opinion in Davis v. Huey
certainly implies that this is the law in Texas. Moreover, this rule is supported by the analo-
gous Texas rule that parties may agree that an architect or engineer may be the judge of the
proper performance of a contract, and neither party may avoid the decision without showing
that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that the arbiter was guilty of
fraud, misconduct, or bad faith. See, e.g., State v. Martin Bros., 138 Tex. 505, 160 S.W.2d 58
(1942); Austin Bridge Co. v. Teague, 137 Tex. 179, 152 S.W. 2d 1091 (1941); City of San
Antonio v. McKenzie Constr. Co., 136 Tex. 315, 150 S.W.2d 989 (1941).
73. 563 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
74. Id. at 336. The defendants relied on Wald v. West MacGregor Protective Ass'n, 332
S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1960, writ refd n.r.e.), in which it was held that
a community association had no justiciable interest when neither it nor the majority of its
members owned property in the restricted area.
75. 563 S.W.2d at 337.
76. 556 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).
77. 563 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, no writ).
78. The total sale of beer and wine constituted 48.93% of the store's business. Id. at 655.
79. The court placed reliance on the distinction in the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code
between beer and wine permits and liquor store permits and on the fact that restrictions on
land use are narrowly construed, favoring the grantee, with all doubts resolved in favor of
the free and unrestricted use of the property. Id. at 656; see Baker v. Henderson, 137 Tex.
266, 153 S.W.2d 465 (1941).
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nance was the subject of Pearson v. Fort Worth National Bank.8 ° Pearson
bought the property in 1973, subject to a 1969 deed restriction limiting the
property to residential use for twenty-five years. The property, however,
was zoned as a "light industrial" district and all residential dwellings were
prohibited. Pearson sought to have the restriction declared void as unrea-
sonable, arguing that the combined effect of the ordinance and the restric-
tion virtually prohibited any use of the property for the remaining term of
the restriction. The court rejected this argument and held that the deed
restriction, being reasonable in time, was valid.8 The fact that Pearson
bought the property with full knowledge of the zoning applicable to the
property and of the deed restriction was considered by the court to be an
important factor. 82
Finally, the court of civil appeals in Parker v. Kilgore83 held that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a suit filed to enforce certain
restrictions that specified the religious teachings that could be advanced on
the property.84 The court held that the first amendment prohibits the
courts from undertaking to resolve controversies over religious doctrine
and practice.85
2. Easements
Attempts to prove easements by operation of law received substantial
attention during the survey period. In Brooks v. Jones86 the plaintiffs
sought to establish by prescription both a public easement and a private
easement over two roadways located on the defendant's property. The
Texas Supreme Court restated the general rule that to establish a prescrip-
tive easement the plaintiff must show open, notorious, hostile, adverse, un-
interrupted, exclusive, and continuous use for a period of more than ten
years. 87 The evidence showed that both roads were used contemporane-
ously by the owner and by others, and the court held that such contempo-
raneous use was not adverse.88 Accordingly, the supreme court found no
evidence of adverse use for the required length of time.
An implied easement appurtenant may be shown if the dominant and
servient estates were at some time under a common ownership, the use was
80. 564 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
81. Id. at 176-77; see Spencer v. Maverick, 146 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1941, no writ).
82. 564 S.W.2d at 177.
83. 561 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
84. Id. at 625-26. The trial court had held the restrictions void under TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 1293a (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-78). 561 S.W.2d at 625.
85. 561 S.W.2d at 626; see U.S. CONST. amend. 1; Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church,
393 U.S. 440 (1969).
86. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 233 (Mar. 3, 1979).
87. Id. at 235. A failure to prove any one of these essential elements is fatal. See, e.g.,
Daily v. Alarid, 486 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ refd n.r.e.); Rust v.
Engledow, 368 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Heath & Bentley
(1978), supra note i, at 35.
88. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 236; see O'Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273, 339 S.W.2d 878
(1960); Othen v. Rosier, 148 Tex. 485, 226 S.W.2d 622 (1950).
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apparent at the time of the grant to the dominant estate, the use of the
easement was continuous, and the easement is necessary to the use of the
dominant estate.89 In Plagge v. Gambino9" a written lease agreement for a
term of years was held to create sufficient separation of title to support an
implied easement appurtenant.9 '
An easement may be created by estoppel when in a conveyance of land
the vendor represents the existence of an easement that the purchaser be-
lieves and relies upon.92 As shown in Storms v. Tuck,93 the expenditure of
money generally is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of reliance on the
representation. In Lake Meredith Development Co. v. City of Fritch,9 4 how-
ever, the court held that proof of an expenditure of money is not the only
method of proving reliance.95
Viscardi v. Pajestka9 6 concerned an effort to establish a driveway ease-
ment based on a purported dedication to the public contained in a 1921
conveyance that also "dedicated" an alley for the benefit of the owners of
certain lots. The court of civil appeals held that when considered with the
other terms of the conveyance, the use of the words "dedicated" and "ded-
ication" was not controlling, and found that the grantor had intended to
create an easement appurtenant for a selected group of lot owners and not
a public dedication. 97 The Texas Supreme Court, however, reversed and
held that the use by the grantor of words of dedication" supported the
implied finding of the trial court that a public dedication was intended. 99
C. Conveyances
In order to comply with the Statute of Frauds,"° the instrument of con-
veyance must furnish itself, or by reference to some other existing writing,
the means or data by which the land to be conveyed may be identified with
reasonable certainty.'' In City of Austin v. Jamail'0 2 the court held that
the following description was insufficient to comply with the Statute of
89. Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 207 (Tex. 1962). See generally M.
FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 13.1 (3d ed. 1975).
90. 570 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
91. The court relied on Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 48 N.E.2d 678
(1943); Commonwealth v. Burford, 225 Pa. 93, 73 A. 1064 (1909), and on one Texas case,
Adams v. Grapotte, 69 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1934), affid, 130 Tex. 587, 111
S.W.2d 690 (1938). 570 S.W.2d at 109.
92. Doss v. Blackstock, 466 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
93. 566 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978), afl'd in par, rev'd and remanded in
part, 579 S.W.2d 477 (Tex.1979).
94. 564 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
95. 1d. at 429.
96. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 96 (Nov. 25, 1978).
97. Pajestka v. Viscardi, 562 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978).
98. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 98.
99. Id. at 97.
100. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1978-79).
101. See, e.g., Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. 1972); Wilson v. Fisher, 144
Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150 (1945). See generall, 6 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §§ 3020-
3086 (repl. ed. 1963); Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note 1, at 50-52.
102. 555 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Frauds: "a strip of land Two Hundred feet in width over the tracts of land
particularly described as. . .a tract in Travis County, known as a part of
the Daniel Gilbert, 1/3 of a league of land, lying Northwest from the City
of Austin ... , "I3 The description failed to provide sufficient informa-
tion to locate the two hundred foot strip intended to be conveyed. " Little-
john v. Kariel °5 held that a description of the land as "[bleing 50 acres, a
part of the 110 acre tract which is a part of the J. Lawrence Survey in said
County and State, and said 50 acres being off the South end of said 110
acre tract, a part of said Lawrence Survey," 0 6 was not sufficient to identify
the land in question; however, the description in a later conveyance, to-
gether with the reference to a 1908 deed, was sufficient under the Statute of
Frauds. 0 7 In Browning v. West' the land was described simply as the
"same land conveyed" in a prior deed.' 9 The court held this description
insufficient because it did not state that all the land conveyed to the prior
grantee was included, nor did it contain a reference to a document contain-
ing a valid description." o
In Bradford v. Rain"'. legal title to certain oil producing properties
owned by Bradford was assigned to National Distillers and Chemical Cor-
poration, although these assignments were in reality mortgages. National
Distillers joined with Bradford in assigning the property to a trustee for the
benefit of certain creditors of Bradford. The trust agreement provided that
if $25,000 per month was made available to the trustee for payment of
creditors' claims, the trustee could not sell the property; otherwise he could
sell. When all creditors were paid in full, the property would be recon-
veyed subject to the assignment to National Distillers. 1 2 The court held
that the trust agreement created a vested remainder in the property in Na-
tional Distillers,' 3 subject to complete divestment in the event the trustee
exercised the power of sale to satisfy creditors' claims. The court held that
Bradford failed in his burden to show that the conveyance to the trustee,
although absolute on its face, was intended as a mortgage." 4
103. Id. at 151.
104. Id. at 152.
105. 568 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
106. Id. at 453.
107. Id. at 455.
108. 557 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
109. Id. at 850.
110. Id. at 850-51. An otherwise faulty description can be saved in some instances when
the description recites that all the land owned by the grantor, or all his land located within a
certain survey, county, or other definable area, is being conveyed. See Schaffer v. Heiden-
heimer, 96 S.W. 61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906, writ ref d).
111. 562 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
112. Id. at 516-17.
113. A remainder interest is vested when there is a person in being who would have an
immediate right to possession upon the termination of the intermediate estate. Chadwick v.
Bristow, 146 Tex. 481, 208 S.W.2d 888 (1948). The character of a remainder as vested is not
affected by an uncertainty as to the quantity that will be received by the remainderman
when the remainderman becomes entitled to possession. Caples v. Ward, 107 Tex. 341, 179
S.W. 856 (1915).
114. 562 S.W.2d at 519. A conveyance absolute on its face may be shown by parol evi-
dence to have been intended as a mortgage. Wilbanks v. Wilbanks, 160 Tex. 317, 330
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Pulchny v. Pulchny" 5 involved a suit by a father and mother against
their son to cancel a deed allegedly induced by fraud; the son had agreed
to keep his father and mother in his home during their lifetimes, but later
refused. The court of civil appeals held that there was some evidence to
support the jury finding that at the time of the conveyance the son had not
intended to perform his part of the bargain," 6 and therefore affirmed the
judgment cancelling the deed." 7
In Sudderth v. Howard"8 the Sudderths executed a deed conveying their
200 acre homestead to Howard for the sum of $17,400 in cash. On the
same day, Howard executed an instrument granting the Sudderths an op-
tion to repurchase the property for $20,010 in cash, plus any accrued taxes.
The Sudderths sought cancellation of the deed pursuant to article 16, sec-
tion 50 of the Texas Constitution, '9which provides that all "pretended
sales" of a homestead shall be void. Based on a jury finding that no sale
was intended, the trial court rendered judgment cancelling the deed, but
granted the defendant recovery of the price paid for the property.' 20 Al-
though the Sudderths also sought usury penalties on the theory that the
increase in the price of the property constituted interest, the court held that




It is elementary that a deed must be delivered in order to be an effective
conveyance of real property. 122 Moreover, as shown in Robert Burns Con-
crete Contractors, Inc. v. Norman, 23 conveyance by deed also requires ac-
ceptance by the grantee. 24 In Fuqua v. Fuqua125 the court refused to re-
S.W.2d 607 (1960). See generally Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note 1, at 75; Heath &
Bentley (1977), supra note 5, at 59.
115. 555 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
116. A promise to do an act in the future may form the basis for an action in fraud when
made with the intention and purpose of deceiving, with no intention of performing the
agreement. Turner v. Biscoe, 141 Tex. 197, 171 S.W.2d 118 (1943).
117. 555 S.W.2d at 547.
118. 560 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
119. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
120. 560 S.W.2d at 516. Although Howard did not plead for recovery of the purchase
price, the court held that one seeking cancellation of an instrument cannot repudiate the
instrument and retain the benefits from the transaction. 560 S.W.2d at 516; see Texas Co. v.
State, 154 Tex. 494, 281 S.W.2d 83 (1955).
121. TEX. R. Civ. P. 272.
122. See, e.g., Thornton v. Rains, 157 Tex. 65, 299 S.W.2d 287 (1957); Hart v. Rogers,
527 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ refd n.r.e.). Seegeneraly W. BURBY,
REAL PROPERTY § 121 (3d ed. 1965); Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 5, at 35.
123. 561 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
124. See Puckett v. Hoover, 146 Tex. 1, 202 S.W.2d 204 (1947). The rationale behind
this rule is that a conveyance by deed requires the consent of both the grantor and the
grantee. The grantor's consent is shown by delivery of the deed; the consent of the grantee is
manifested by his acceptance. See W. BURBY, supra note 122, § 122, at 304. Generally,
acceptance is presumed if the conveyance is beneficial to the grantee. See Klingaman v.
Burch, 216 Ind. 695, 25 N.E.2d 996 (1940); Taylor v. Sanford, 108 Tex, 340, 193 S.W. 661
(1917). Additionally, acceptance is presumed from the fact that the deed was recorded.
McAnally v. Texas Co., 124 Tex. 196, 76 S.W.2d 997 (1934).
125. 559 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ refd).
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examine its earlier decision' 26 that the purchaser's title related back to the
date the deed was delivered in escrow. Terrell v. Graham'27 held that
deeds that provided that they should take effect and become absolute upon
the grantor's death were not testamentary in nature but were deeds that
created present estates in expectancy.' 28
In Driskill v. Forbes'29 the court cancelled a deed that was never deliv-
ered by the grantor and was not intended at the time of execution to be
operative as a fee simple conveyance. In Clabaugh v. City of Tyler 3° the
plaintiff sued for rescission on the theory that the city's agent had falsely
represented that the city had the power to take the plaintiff to court and
obtain title to her land. The court disallowed plaintiffs claim since the city
actually had power to institute condemnation proceedings to acquire
plaintiffs land. ''
In Rankin v. Naftalis'32 the plaintiffs, parties to an oil and gas drilling
venture, sued to impress a constructive trust on an oil and gas lease
purchased by one venturer in his own name. The Texas Supreme Court
held that although the parties to an oil and gas venture are in a fiduciary
relationship, the fiduciary duties extend only to dealings within the scope
of the relationship; there was no impropriety on the part of the venturer in
purchasing the lease.' 33
Two cases decided during the survey period concerned warranties of ti-
tle. In Haddad v. Boon' 4 the defendant, in his deed to the plaintiff, had
reserved a 1/32 royalty interest, but had failed to take exception to an
undivided 1/16 royalty interest reserved in an earlier deed. The court held
that the defendant breached his warranty of title under the deed and there-
fore was estopped to assert that title against one, such as the plaintiff, who
claimed under that deed. 3 5 In Bentley v. Andrewartha'31 the purchaser
had purchased two pieces of property, and later substituted these for a
third parcel, also owned by the seller in the previous transaction. The
third parcel of land was subject to an encumbrance, which the purchaser
allegedly orally agreed to pay, and did in fact pay. At the time of the
126. Fuqua v. Fuqua, 528 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ
ref d n.r.e.), discussed in Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 5, at 36.
127. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 200 (Jan. 27, 1979). The case involved reciprocal deeds executed
by two brothers, each of whom conveyed an estate in expectancy to the other upon the death
of the grantor. The Texas Supreme Court held that upon the death of the first brother the
surviving brother owned full fee title to the entire tract.
128. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1296 (Vernon 1962).
129. 566 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
130. 557 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
131. Id. at 856.
132. 557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977).
133. Id. at 944-45. The supreme court held that the fiduciary relationship created by a
joint drilling venture does not forbid further acquisition and development of leases by indi-
vidual venturers so long as those leases are not within the scope of the enterprise or are not a
natural outgrowth from the enterprise. Id. at 945 (citing Foley v. Phillips, 211 Kan. 735, 508
P.2d 975 (1973)).
134. 557 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
135. Id. at 807.
136. 565 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
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exchange the seller issued a warranty deed conveying the third parcel to
the purchaser, apparently without exception to the encumbrance against
the property. The purchaser brought an action for breach of warranty to
convey good title because of the encumbrance. The trial court entered
summary judgment for the purchaser on the claimed breach of warranty.
The court of civil appeals, however, reversed and remanded, holding that
parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration when the deed
recites ten dollars and other good and valuable consideration' 3 7 and that
questions of fact existed as to whether the purchaser had agreed to assume
the encumbrance as part of the consideration for the conveyance.'
38
Mutual mistake of fact is a ground for reformation of a written instru-
ment. 139 In Cornish v. Yarbrough4 ' the court reformed the deed in ques-
tion so as to include certain liens that the grantee had agreed to assume. In
that case, the Ashworths had conveyed the property to the Yarbroughs and
retained a vendor's lien securing a note that was further secured by a deed
of trust. The deed and the deed of trust were duly recorded. Later the
Yarbroughs sold the property to the Harrises, but the deed failed to recite
the Harrises' agreement to assume the existing liens. The Harrises subse-
quently defaulted and the property was sold at trustee's sale to the Yar-
broughs. After the trustee's sale, the Harrises executed a deed to the
Cornishes. Suit was brought by the Yarbroughs to reform their deed to the
Harrises and for title and possession under the trustee's deed. The
Cornishes filed a cross-action in trespass to try title. The court held that
the evidence overwhelmingly showed the existence of a mutual mistake
and therefore justified reformation of the deed. The Cornishes argued that
since the original deed to the Harrises did not refer to the Ashworth liens
the title acquired by the Yarbroughs at the trustee's sale should inure to
benefit of the Cornishes under the doctrine of after-acquired title or estop-
pel by deed.141 The court held that since the deed from the Yarbroughs
was reformed to except the Ashworth liens from the conveyance to the
Harrises, "the deed as reformed did not warrant any title to the Harrises
... insofar as the Ashworth lien was concerned."' 42 Thus, the Yar-
broughs were free to reacquire title at foreclosure sale under the lien.'
4 3
Finally, the court held that the Cornishes were not bona fide purchasers
because they were charged with notice of the liens since they were re-
137. See, e.g., Latham v. Dement, 409 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, writ
refd n.r.e.); Puckett v. Frizzell, 377 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, no writ).
138. 565 S.W.2d at 592.
139. See Henderson v. Odessa Bldg. & Fin. Co., 24 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1930, judgmt adopted).
140. 558 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
141. The doctrine of after-acquired title or estoppel by deed holds that if the deed repre-
sents that at the time of its execution the grantor owns the title the deed purports to convey,
the grantor may not later assert a position inconsistent with the provisions of the deed to the
prejudice of the grantee and those claiming under the grantee. See McDaniel v. Cherry, 353
S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
142. 558 S.W.2d at 32.
143. The doctrine of after-acquired title or estoppel by deed does not apply to a later title
acquired in a manner which is not inconsistent with the prior conveyance. See Talley v.
Howsley, 142 Tex. 81, 176 S.W.2d 158 (1943). This includes acquisition at a sale to foreclose
a vendor's lien. Pierce v. Camp, 30 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1930, writ refd).
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corded in the Cornishes' direct chain of title." 4Additionally, the evidence




As a general rule there is no duty on the part of a title company to
discover or inform the proposed insured of title defects; the duty is to in-
demnify the insured against loss due to defects in title. 146 According to the
court in Dixon v. Shirley,147 however, a title company cannot "close its
eyes to known . . . discrepancies between its title policy and the order for
the title policy."'14 The insured in Dixon was the purchaser under a con-
tract with the Cobbs calling for a conveyance of all of lot 16; the Cobbs,
however, owned only one-half of lot 16. Instead of notifying the purchaser
of this discrepancy, the title company caused a warranty deed to be pre-
pared and issued an owner policy covering only the one-half of lot 16 that
was owned by the Cobbs. The court held that the title company had the
duty to notify the parties that the company could not insure the property
described in the contract. The court stated:
The title company cannot intentionally or negligently permit parties
to a contract to close a real estate transaction at its place of business,
at its invitation, knowing all along that the contract for sale called for
different property than that set forth in its policy which it issued with-
out full disclosure. 49
The court thus held that there existed material fact issues as to whether the
title company was negligent in failing to apprise the parties of the differ-
ence of the land described in the contract and the land insured under the
owner policy.' 5°
In Lawyers Title Co. P. Author' the court held that when Lawyers Title
agreed to handle Author's real estate closing and to record all necessary
documents, including releases, and when Author was assured by Lawyers
Title that "everything necessary to the closing had been accomplished,"
Lawyers Title was in the position of an indemnitor of Author with regard
144. A purchaser is charged with notice of and is bound by every recital, reference, and
reservation contained in or fairly disclosed by every instrument which forms an essential
link in the chain of title under which the purchaser claims. See Wessels v. Rio Bravo Oil
Co., 250 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App -Eastland 1952, writ ref'd).
145. A bona fide purchaser is one who has acquired apparent legal title in good faith, for
valuable consideration, and without actual or constructive notice of any outstanding equity,
adverse interest, or title. See Davidson v. Ryle, 103 Tex. 209, 124 S.W. 616 (1910).
146. See Wolff v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 345 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183
(Tex. 1977), discussed in Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note I, at 44-45.
147. 558 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
148. Id. at 117.
149. Id.; e. Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1977); Southwest
Title Ins. Co. v. Northland Bldg. Corp., 542 S.W.2d 436, 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1976), affdinpart, 552 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1977); Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note 1. at 44-
47.
150. 558 S.W.2d at 117.
151. 569 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
[Vol. 33
REAL PROPERTY
to financial loss by Author because of the failure of Lawyers Title to rec-
ord certain releases until nearly a year after the closing. 152 In Kutner-Jones
Development Corp. v. Fidelity Title Co. "' the court held that summary
judgment for the defendant title company was precluded because genuine
issues of material fact existed as to whether the title company holding es-
crowed funds under directions to pay off a specific lien paid off more than
was required to satisfy a lien'54 and whether the title company used rea-
sonable care to determine the amount necessary to obtain a release of the
lien.
In Hicks v. Wright' the branch manager of a title company sued to
recover an amount paid by him to satisfy certain first liens on real prop-
erty. An employee of the title company had issued title policy binders
without obtaining releases of the first liens. The court held that there was
no evidence of fraud, any illegal inducement to "insure around," or civil
conspiracy. Moreover, the court denied relief under the theory of equita-
ble subrogation because of a release the title company had given at the
time the first liens were paid.'
56
The title insurer is obligated to defend any suit filed against the insured
in which an adverse claim to the property is asserted. 157 In Security Title &
Trust Co. v. Tower Land & Investment Co. 158 the court held that the obli-
gation of an insurer to defend must be determined from the allegations of
the pleading without reference to the truth or falsity of those allegations or
the claimants' ultimate right to recover. Moreover, any doubt as to
whether the insurer must defend is to be resolved in favor of the in-
sured. 159
On February 27, 1979 the State Board of Insurance adopted certain
amendments to the Basic Manual of Rules, Rates, and Forms for the Writ-
ing of Title Insurance in the State of Texas. 160 Among the changes
adopted was an amendment to rate rule R-3 to make it clear that owner
policies may be written for an amount that includes the cost of contem-
plated improvements and the promulgation of a new form of commitment
for title insurance.16' Additionally, the Board adopted new rate rule R-18
152. Id. at 581.
153. 567 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
154. Id. at 84.
155. 564 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
156. Id. at 797.
157. See article 3 of conditions and stipulations of Texas standard form owner and mort-
gagee policies of title insurance. The insurer is also obligated to furnish, at its own expense,
the legal services necessary to prosecute a suit by or on behalf of the insured against an
adverse claimant. See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. McKee, 354 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ.
Apr.-Fort Worth 1962, no writ).
8. 560 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
159. Id. at 211.
160. The State Board of Insurance has authority to promulgate rules, forms and pre-
mium rates. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 1.02, 1.04, 9.07, & 9.21 (Vernon 1963 & Pam. Supp.
1963-67).
161. Record of Official Action of the State Board of Insurance, No. 34997 (Feb. 27,
1979).
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regarding creation of a new loan contemplated by a construction lender.'62
II. CONTRACTS AND SALES OF REAL PROPERTY; BROKERAGE; JOINT
VENTURES AND PARTNERSHIPS
by
Jesse . Heath, Jr. *
A. Contracts and Sales of Real Property
1. Contract Enforceability in General
In Bridewell v. Pritchett,'63 Bridewell had purchased property and had
assumed an obligation to pay the first lien note, then in default, which was
secured by a deed of trust lien on the property. Pritchett, the lienholder
and original seller of the property, insisted that the interest rate on the note
be increased from seven to eight and one-half percent as a part of the new
agreement with Bridewell, but Bridewell refused to sign a new agreement
at the higher rate. The court refused to order specific performance of the
contract for the sale of real property because no agreement was reached as
to the rate of interest that would be charged on the second lien purchase
money promissory note. The court held that under the facts of this trans-
action the rate of interest was a matter "of the essence" on which there had
been no "meeting of the minds"; accordingly, there was no binding con-
tract that could be enforced. The court concluded that this was not a case
where there had never been any agreement on the interest rate, which
would have allowed the court to supply that detail. Instead, the court
found the contract to be missing an essential term and therefore unen-
forceable and allowed the lienholder to proceed with the foreclosure sale.
Each survey period includes a number of cases involving the sufficiency
of legal descriptions of real property in contracts for sale. Under Texas
law the contract must contain the means or data by which the property can
be identified with reasonable certainty or refer to another existing writing
162. The new rate rule R-18 reads as follows:
When a Mortgagee Policy has been issued insuring the lien of a construction
loan to be taken up, renewed, extended or satisfied by a new loan, the pre-
mium on the Mortgagee Policy insuring the lien of the new loan shall be at the
then promulgated minimum policy Basic Premium Rate; provided however, if
the Mortgagee Policy insuring the lien of the new loan is in an amount in
excess of the amount of the Mortgagee Policy insuring the lien of the construc-
tion loan, the premium shall be equal to the greater of (i) the then promul-
gated minimum policy Basic Premium Rate, or (ii) the excess of the then
promulgated Basic Premium Rate on the amount of the Mortgagee Policy in-
suring the lien of the new loan less the then promulgated Basic Premium Rate
on the amount of the mortgagee policy insuring the lien of the construction
loan.
* B.B.A., University of Texas and Southern Methodist University; LL.B., Southern
Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Heath & Knippa, Houston, Texas.
163. 562 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
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that provides such a description.'64 If the description of the property in
the contract is inadequate, reformation of the contract to furnish a suffi-
cient property description may be ordered by a court upon proof of the
true agreement of the parties and proof that the erroneous inclusion or
omission of the contested provision was the result of a mutual mistake.' 65
In Ogilvie v. Hill'6 6 the seller asked for cancellation of a contract on the
ground that the property description was legally insufficient. The contract
description referred only to a 21.37 acre tract of land out of a larger tract
located in a specified survey and county, and provided that the exact 21.37
acres were to be determined by a survey. After noting its frustration in
applying the Texas rule requiring a written description in the contract to
specific fact situations, the court of civil appeals held that the description
in this contract was insufficient. 6 7 Facts satisfying either of two recog-
nized exceptions to the general Texas rule were not present in Ogilvie.
This was neither a contract that allows the purchaser of an undescribed
portion of the seller's larger described tract to select and locate the portion
that is to be conveyed,' 68 nor one that includes a reference in the contract
to the seller's ownership of the property, which would provide the requisite
certainty of description. 69 Nevertheless, the court held that the contract
should not have been cancelled on a motion for summary judgment be-
cause an issue of fact as to reformation of the contract appeared to be
present. The purchasers had advised the trial court before entry of judg-
ment of their claim for reformation based upon a mutual mistake in the
omission of a field note description of the property.' 70 The seller had also
based his suit for rescission on his failure to perform a condition required
164. U.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. Dauley, 535 S.W.2d 623, 627 (Tex. 1976), discussed in
Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 5, at 47-48. See also Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d
538, 539 (Tex. 1972); Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 56-57, 188 S.W.2d 150, 152 (1945); 6 G.
THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §§ 369-374 (repl. ed. 1961); Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note
t, at 50.
165. National Resort Communities, Inc. v. Cain, 526 S.W.2d 510, 513-14 (Tex. 1975).
166. 563 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
167. Id. at 848. The same method to describe property was used in Chisholm v. Hipes,
552 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ), also without success. Chisholm is
discussed in Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note 1, at 52.
168. 563 S.W.2d at 848. This exception is discussed in Martin v. Skelton, 567 S.W.2d
585, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see text accompanying notes
201-03 infra. But see U.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. Dauley, 535 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1976), and cases
discussed in Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note 1, at 51, where the seller's right to retain an
undescribed portion of the property under the contract rendered the contract unenforceable.
169. 563 S.W.2d at 848. The summary judgment proof showed that the seller owned the
property and that it was the only property he owned in the county. This was insufficient to
escribe the property; the court stated that the contract itself must contain the reference to
ownership and that ownership will not be implied. This exception is discussed in Newsom v.
Moertle, 557 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ dism'd); see text accompanying
notes 204-07 infra.
170. The appellate court restated the reformation rule:
When the minds of the buyer and seller meet as to the identity of the specific
tract of land which is the subject of their contract, but by mutual mistake they
misdescribe it or omit a correct description thereof, the contract may be re-
formed to correct the error or to supply the omission. . . . And the mutual
mistake which will warrant such reformation may be either that the parties
mistakenly believed the description in the contract was legally sufficient, ...
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in the contract, his obligation to build a road to the property. After restat-
ing the familiar rule that Texas courts abhor forfeitures of contracts, the
court construed the obligation to build the road as a covenant, not a condi-
tion. Furthermore, since the obligation was to be performed by the seller,
the court refused to allow the breaching party to seize upon his breach as
grounds to terminate a contract when the other party wished to affirm it. 17'
An attempt to describe real property by reference to a street address,
without mention of the city, county, and state in which the property was
located, was held to be an insufficient description in Wild v. Hargrave.'72
The court in Martin v. Thalman' 71 found that merely attaching a map as
an exhibit to a settlement agreement did not cure an otherwise inadequate
description because the property was not colored or identified on the map
by other means.
In Cheatwood v. De Los Santo174 a residence being purchased under an
oral installment contract was destroyed by fire. The issues before the court
were whether full payment of the purchase price was required for specific
enforcement of an oral installment contract to sell real property and
whether the purchaser was entitled to have the proceeds from the seller's
fire insurance policy credited to the unpaid balance of the purchase price,
with the excess paid to the purchaser. Before the house was destroyed by
fire, the purchaser had taken possession of the property, made what the
court considered to be valuable improvements, 75and paid nineteen
monthly installments on the purchase price. 176 The court held that the
payment of a part of the purchase price, coupled with possession and the
improvements, was sufficient to entitle the purchaser to enforce the oral
contract. The court applied principles of equitable conversion to appor-
tion the fire insurance proceeds. Because the purchaser held equitable title
to the property and, therefore, bore the loss caused by the fire, the court
ruled that the insurance proceeds constituted a trust fund for his benefit,
even though the insurance policies had been carried by the seller. Accord-
ingly, the insurance proceeds were credited to the balance owed on the
purchase price, and the remainder belonged to the purchaser. 177
or that field notes were intended to be, but were not, attached to the contract
either at or after its signing.
563 S.W.2d at 848-49 (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 849-50. Compare Rich v. McMullan, 506 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (purchaser's failure to obtain financing on terms pro-
vided in the contract because of seller's interference).
172. 565 S.W.2d 558, 559-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ dism'd).
173. 568 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
174. 561 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
175. The purchaser spent only $115.85 on materials and the remainder of the "valuable
improvements" was in the value of his own labor. Id. at 278.
176. Id. at 276-77. The three requirements for taking an oral contract out of the Statute
of Frauds, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968), are discussed in Heath &
Bentley (1977), supra note 5, at 43.
177. 561 S.W.2d at 278-79. This issue had been left open in Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 163 Tex. 250, 353 S.W.2d 841 (1962). In Paramount Fire Ins. Co.
both the seller and the purchaser carried casualty insurance, and the court held that the
purchaser's insurance carrier had to pay the claim. Compare Fellmer v. Gruber, 261
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2 Waiver of Objections to Seller's Title
A contract for the sale of real property generally requires the seller to
furnish the purchaser with a title report, a title policy commitment, or an
abstract of title. The seller of the property may be uncertain at the time
the contract is made whether title objections unknown to him will be dis-
covered. To avoid the difficulties of unexpected defects in title, the seller
should list in the contract the known or "permitted" title exceptions, pro-
vide for waiver of any additional exceptions if no objection is made by the
purchaser within a certain number of days after the title information is
furnished, and include a provision allowing the seller additional time to
cure the objection if any is made. Similar contract provisions were in-
volved in two cases decided during the survey period. The contract provi-
sion before the court in Huddleston v. Fergeson 78 required Huddleston, as
the seller, to furnish an abstract of title within thirty days after the contract
was executed and required Fergeson to list any title objections within ten
days after the abstract was furnished. It further provided that no title ob-
jections would be considered as breaches unless so listed by Fergeson.
Huddleston furnished an abstract of title to Fergeson, but Fergeson failed
to object until after expiration of the ten-day period.' 79 The appellate
court held that the contract provision was binding and that "[tlhe legal
effect of her default [failure to object to title] is that she cannot complain of
the absence of a marketable title."' 80
The buyer also alleged that the seller failed to give immediate possession
even though the contract provided that Huddleston would deliver posses-
sion of the property at the closing. After the contract was made, Fergeson
required Huddleston to give assurances before the closing that possession
could be delivered. Fergeson testified, over objection, that Huddleston
promised immediate possession upon signing the contract, and that she
was unable to go upon the property because an adjoining property owner
locked the gates across the access road.' 8 ' The appellate court held that
this testimony should have been excluded because it contradicted the terms
of the contract that all agreements were contained in the contract. 82 The
right of ingress and egress to the property was not promised by the con-
tract, and the appellate court held that delivery of the deed would give
constructive possession to the purchaser, thus satisfying the contractual re-
quirement of possession at closing. Consequently, unless the circum-
stances indicate otherwise, actual possession is not necessary to constitute
N.W.2d 173 (Iowa 1978), with the holding on this point in Cheatwood. In Fellmer the court
held that after a contract for the sale of realty is executed, risk of loss passes to purchaser
under Iowa law of equitable conversion. Accordingly, the purchaser was entitled to pro-
ceeds payable for a fire loss occurring before closing under an insurance policy the seller had
agreed to carry until the closing.
178. 564 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
179. Id. at 450-51.
180. Id. at 452.
181. Id. at 450-51.
182. Id. at 452-53.
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possession. 183
The contract before the court in Schriewer v. Liedtke184 provided that
the purchaser order the title report and required that he make any title
objections within fifteen days after he received the report. The seller then
had thirty additional days to cure any title objections. The contract al-
lowed the purchaser to terminate only if title failed as to ten percent or
more of the 1,040 acres; otherwise the only remedy of the purchaser was to
have the purchase price proportionately reduced. The purchaser timely
objected to title exceptions involving less than ten percent of the property.
The purchaser refused to complete the sale because of the title defects and
the seller's failure to provide a survey.' 85 The court found the buyer's
grounds for refusal invalid. The title objections raised by the purchaser
involved less than ten percent of the total acreage, which only entitled the
purchaser to a reduction in the purchase price, not to a termination of the
contract. Although the purchaser could have objected to the seller's title
on other grounds, the court held: "We do not permit appellants, once hav-
ing given their reasons for not performing under the contract, to change
completely their reasons for not performing to the detriment of appel-
lees."' 86 The additional objections raised to defects in closing documents
might have been cured by the seller had they been raised in a timely fash-
ion, but the court held that these additional exceptions were not valid and
ordered specific performance of the contract against the purchaser.1
8 7
Huddlesion and Schriewer emphasize both the importance to the seller
of having a provision in the contract that requires the purchaser to object
to title exceptions not permitted under the contract, and the importance to
the purchaser to make any objections to title within the specified time pe-
riod. Schriewer further demonstrates that nontitle objections18 8 should be
made in time to allow the seller an opportunity to cure the objection and
illustrates the practical limitations of the remedy of specific performance.
The sellers had to wait over three years to obtain a final judgment of spe-
cific performance against the purchasers, during which time the sellers
paid the ad valorem taxes and other costs of ownership, while the property
presumably appreciated in value.'8 9
183. Id. at 453.
184. 561 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ dism'd).
185. Id. at 587.
186. Id.
187. The court quoted from 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 762, at 528 (1960):
A buyer of land who points out specific defects in title, as his only stated rea-
son for rejecting it and refusing to pay can not set up other defects as a de-
fense, if those other defects could and would have been cured in time but for
the buyer's misleading the seller into thinking that they were regarded as im-
material or were non-existent.
561 S.W.2d at 588.
188. The nontitle objection was that the contract provided for one second lien deed of
trust, instead of the three that were delivered at the closing, and required the first
lienholder's consent to create a second lien which was not obtained. 561 S.W.2d at 587-88.
189. The writer of this Article has been advised that after the purchasers dismissed their
writ of error to the Texas Supreme Court, they agreed to complete the sale.
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If the contract does not specify a time period for making objections to
additional title exceptions, how long does the purchaser have to give notice
of an objection? An objection made at the closing was found to be too late
under the facts before the court in Hugley v. Caldwell '9 where the contract
called for an owner policy of title insurance to be furnished to the pur-
chaser without any encumbrances other than the ones listed in an exhibit
to the contract. A title policy commitment was delivered to the purchaser
twenty-seven days before the scheduled closing date, and contained a
printed exception for "rights of parties in possession."'' The purchaser
waited until the closing date to object to this exception. The title company
had indicated its willingness to delete the "rights of parties in possession"
exception if an on-the-site inspection revealed that there were no adverse
parties in possession of the property, but the inspection could not be made
before the letter of credit that was given to secure the purchaser's obliga-
tions would expire.' 92 The appellate court held that by failing to raise the
objection until the closing, the purchaser was as a matter of law estopped
from raising the objection at the closing; by his delay the purchaser had led
the seller to believe that the printed exception was acceptable and had de-
nied the seller an opportunity to have an on-the-site inspection made
before the closing. 193 Two other objections raised by the purchaser were
also rejected by the court. The court first held that a six-acre variance on a
sale of 225 acres "more or less" was an allowable variance.' 94 Secondly,
the seller's failure to furnish the purchaser with copies of sales contracts
with third parties for individual lots within the tract was not a default
where there was no evidence that any sales contracts existed. Accordingly,
the seller had performed the contract and was entitled to collect on the
letters of credit after the purchaser refused to close.' 9 5
3. Options to Purchase Real Property
In Campbell v. Northwestern National Life Insurance Co. 196 the pur-
ported option contract for the purchase of an apartment project was found
to be unenforceable because an essential element was missing: the time
and manner of the payment of the purchase price. The option contract
190. 559 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
191. Id. at 878. Procedural Rule P-3 promulgated by the State Board of Insurance states
the following:
In an Owner or Mortgagee Policy, where Insured waives inspection, and is
satisfied to accept the policy subject to the Rights of Parties in Possession, the
Company shall have the right to make a general exception as to 'Rights of
Parties in Possession.' In all such cases, the Company must obtain written
waiver from Insured, which waiver must be retained and preserved by the
Company.
192. 559 S. W.2d at 879.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 879. The words "more or less" are intended to relieve exactness in measure-
ment, Bickler v. Bickler, 403 S.W.2d 354, 360 (Tex. 1966), and should be avoided if exact-
ness is expected.
195. 559 S.W.2d at 879.
196. 573 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. 1978).
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was also unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds'9 7 because it was oral.
Although Campbell could not specifically enforce the purported contract,
or recover damages for a breach of that contract, the Texas Supreme Court
held that he could recover in quantum meruit the reasonable value of the
services he rendered to the owner in managing and remodeling the apart-
ment project.198 Northwestern contended that Campbell had been paid in
full pursuant to a management contract. Campbell testified, however, that
he agreed to a very low management fee because of the option; without the
option, he would have had no interest in the job. The jury found that
$80,095.53 would fairly compensate Campbell for the difference between
the agreed management fee and the reasonable value of the services per-
formed.' 99
One of the exceptions that can cure an otherwise insufficient legal
description that was discussed in Ogilvie v. Hill" is illustrated in Martin v.
Skelton.2° 1 In Martin the optionee had the right to purchase one or more
undescribed acres out of a twenty acre tract. The court held that the op-
tionee had the right to select a two acre tract out of the twenty acres and
had sufficiently described the two acre tract when he exercised the option
by referring to it as being as nearly square as could be surveyed, with 297
feet along the east line and 297 feet along the south line of the twenty acre
tract.2"2 Accordingly, the optionee was entitled to specific performance as
to the two acre tract. The court also held that under the facts and in light
of the absence of any provision in the contract specifying the means by
which the notice of the exercise of the option was to be given, notice by
mail was sufficient.203
The second exception to the requirement of a sufficient description of
the property discussed in Ogilvie was considered in Newsom v. Moertle.21
Newsom involved a first option to purchase any part of a 99.48 acre tract
that the owner might sell. The optionee had purchased four acres of land
out of the 99.48 acre tract, and the deed of the four acre tract referred to
the grantee-optionee's option to purchase the "adjoining" property that
previously had been conveyed to the grantor and that was owned by the
grantor. The court found those references sufficient to permit the showing
by extrinsic evidence of the part of the 99.48 acres owned by the grantor.205
197. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(a),(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
198. 573 S.W.2d at 498.
199. Id.
200. Ogilvie v. Hill, 563 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
See text accompanying notes 164-71 supra.
201. 567 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
202. Id. at 588. The court cited Best Bldg. Co. v. Sikes, 394 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which the court said:
It appears that existence in one party of an unqualified right of determination
or selection of an amount and location of premises (within an area certainly
ascertainable) meets the requirements of the Statute of Frauds where there is
no necessity of any further agreement or approval by the other party.
203. 567 S.W.2d at 62. See generally Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d 805 (1978).
204. 557 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ dism'd).
205. Id. at 842. In Kmiec v. Reagan, 556 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1977), a case not cited by
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The grantor, in fact, owned only fifty of the 99.48 acres and had conveyed
five of those acres to her son, depriving the optionee of the right to
purchase those acres. The court upheld the jury's award of $7,000 in dam-
ages to the optionee, which represented the difference in the value of the
four acre tract owned by the optionee with the option and the value of that
tract without the option."° The grantor unsuccessfully argued that the
conveyance to her son was a gift.2 °
7
The option provision before the court in Austin National Bank v. Capital
Lodge No. 23, 1. O.F2 °8 provided that the price the optionee would pay
for the property was its "then value. '2 °9 Although the contract did not
establish an exact purchase price, it did provide that the price was to be no
more than $170,000 and no less than $115,000. If the parties could not
agree upon the purchase price the price was to be determined through ar-
bitration.2 '° Before exercising the option, the bank-optionee had
purchased several adjoining tracts to assemble a single tract upon which to
construct a building. Neither the parties nor the arbitrators could agree
upon a purchase price. The bank argued that the value should not take
into consideration the price it had paid for the adjoining lots, because they
were "assemblage sales."' 2 1" The court, however, held that "value" in this
context meant market value, which it defined as the value that can be ob-
tained at a private sale between a seller, who wants to sell but is not obli-
gated to sell, and a purchaser, who wants to buy but is not obligated to
buy. The best evidence of market value, the court concluded, is recent
comparable sales, especially sales that occur in the same area, within the
same time period, and that involve land of a similar character and im-
provement, when they are not forced sales. 2
A case that has significant implication beyond its limited facts is Delta
Enterprises v. Gage.2 3 Gage sold Delta Enterprises options to purchase
two tracts of land at a price that included a relatively small down payment
and a promissory note bearing interest at a seven and one-half percent
annual rate from the date the option was given, not from the date of the
exercise of the option. Delta Enterprises sued Gage for a recovery under
the Texas usury statute2 4 and argued that the amounts paid at the speci-
the court, the Texas Supreme Court held: "When the grantor is stated to be the owner of the
property to be conveyed and it is proved that the grantor owns only a single tract answering
the description, the land is identified with reasonable certainty." But is this rule applicable
when the grantor owns only a part of the adjoining tract? Compare cases discussed in Heath
& Bentley (1978), supra note 1, at 51.
206. 557 S.W.2d at 842.
207. Note that a different result might have obtained if grantor had succeeded in show-
ing it was gift. Cf Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 962 (1968), discussing the inapplicability of a first
refusal right to an involuntary sale, such as a condemnation or foreclosure.
208. 558 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
209. Id. at 948.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 949.
212. Id. at 950.
213. 555 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.).
214. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971).
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fled seven and one-half percent rate at the time the options were exercised
constituted interest at a usurious rate.2 5 The jury, however, found that
those amounts were not interest. The court of civil appeals disregarded the
contractual designation of these amounts as "interest" and concluded that
seven and one-half percent was "merely a convenient yardstick which was
used to express the changing price at which the option itself could be exer-
cised."2 6 It was not, the court held, compensation for the use, forbear-
ance, or detention of money, within the meaning of the usury statute.21 7
4. Executory Contracts Under Article 1301b
When a purchaser enters an executory contract218 for the sale of real
property "used or to be used as the purchaser's residence," article 1301b 2 19
provides that the purchaser's interest in the property can be forfeited for a
purchaser's default and the outstanding indebtedness accelerated only if
the seller first gives the timely statutory notice of the intention to take that
action. The purchaser can, however, "avoid the forfeiture of his interest
and the acceleration of his indebtedness by complying with the terms of
the contract up to the date of compliance notwithstanding any agreement
to the contrary. '220 In Sanchez P. Brandt221 the purchaser of an unim-
proved ten acre tract sought to avoid a forfeiture of the executory contract
on the ground that the seller had failed to comply with the notice require-
ments of article 1301b. The contract required only a notice of the forfei-
ture, with no time period for curing the default. The jury found that at the
time the contract was signed, the purchaser intended to use the property
for the purpose of establishing a residence, although no improvements had
been constructed or begun when the forfeiture question arose four and
one-half years later. The seller argued that the use of the word "home" in
the notice provision of the statute222 showed a legislative intent that article
1301b apply only to property on which there is a "presently existing dwell-
ing suitable for habitation or a dwelling in the process of construction. ' '223
215. 555 S.W.2d at 557.
216. Id. at 558.
217. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a) (Vernon 1971).
218. Under an executory contract, the seller retains title to the property until all or a
specified portion of the purchase price has been paid.
219. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1301b (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-78).
220. Id. § 2. The time period within which the purchaser can cure the default by com-
plying with the contract terms up to the date of compliance is 15 days if less than 10% of the
rice has been paid, 30 days if less than 20% has been paid, and 60 days if 20% or more has
een paid. Id. art. 1301b.
221. 567 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ret'd n.r.e.).
222. The notice the seller is required to give under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
1301b, § 1(e) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-78) reads as follows:
NOTICE
YOU ARE LATE IN MAKING YOUR PAYMENT UNDER THE CON-
TRACT TO BUY YOUR HOME. UNLESS YOU MAKE THE PAYMENT
BY (date), THE SELLER HAS THE RIGHT TO TAKE POSSESSION OF
YOUR HOME AND TO KEEP ALL PAYMENTS YOU HAVE MADE TO
DATE.
223. 567 S.W.2d at 258.
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The court, however, construed the plain language of the statute to include
property that will be used as the purchaser's residence in the future,
whether it is improved or unimproved at the time the notice must be given.
The court reasoned that any conflict between the language in the statute
and the language in the statutory notice had to be resolved in favor of the
legislative intent expressed in the statute.224 Accordingly, the purchaser
was entitled to specific performance of the contract, since he had tendered
the balance of the contract price to the seller. It thus appears that article
1301b applies to unimproved property that the purchaser intends to use as
a residence in the future, provided that the intent exists when the contract
is signed. Because a seller cannot know a purchaser's undisclosed intent,
to avoid an unexpected application of article 1301b, the seller should have
the buyer declare any intended residential use in the contract. If there is
any doubt, the seller should comply with the notice requirements of article
1301b. It should also be noted that compliance with article 1301b is only
required in suits for forfeiture and acceleration; a seller need not comply
with article 1301b in actions to cancel and rescind the contract.225
Article 1301b specifically requires notice if there is to be a forfeiture of
the purchaser's interest and an acceleration of the indebtedness. Is the
statutory notice required if a forfeiture is declared on the basis of a non-
payment of an installment on the contract but without an acceleration of
the balance of the contract price? Is it necessary for the purchaser who
receives notice under article 1301b to pay the entire balance owed under
the contract, as the purchaser did in Sanchez, or may the purchaser cure
only the past due payments and avoid acceleration? The wording of arti-
cle 1301b, section 2 to the effect that acceleration can be avoided if the
purchaser complies with the terms of the contract "up to the date of com-
pliance" indicates that the purchaser need only bring the contract pay-
ments current. These two questions have not been answered by the courts.
Continuing occupancy of the residence by the purchaser was held not to
be required in order for article 1301b's notice provisions to apply in Kirk v.
Barnett.226 The court held that the statutory requirement of notice of for-
feiture applied to a residence that had been used by the purchaser after the
contract was signed but was being leased to another party when the default
occurred. The court apparently gave credence to the purchaser's testimony
that she planned to again use the house as her residence in its decision that
such intent entitled her to the statutory notice.227 Sanchez and Kirk do not
provide a clear answer as to when "used or to be used as the purchaser's
residence" is to be determined, but the purchaser's intent for residential
224. Id. The court also referred to the well-established rule that forfeitures under con-
tract for the sale of real property are disfavored by Texas courts. The court interpreted art.
1301b to be for the purpose of avoiding a forfeiture without notice. Id.
225. See Wentworth v. Medellin, 529 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1975, no writ). See also Marshall v. Garcia, 514 S.W.2d 513, 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Wentworth also advanced the argument that art. 1301b does
not apply to unimproved real property, but the court did not decide that issue.
226. 566 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978 no writ).
227. Id. at 123.
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use may be required both at the time the property is purchased and at the
time the seller's notice must be given.
5. Representations and Warranties,- Unilateral Mistake; Fraud
In two cases decided during the survey period, a purchaser's actual in-
spection or his duty to inquire about the property precluded recovery
based upon misrepresentation or nondisclosure of facts about the property.
In Roland v. McCullough228 the purchasers sought to enjoin a judicial fore-
closure of the property and to reform or rescind the contract of sale on the
ground either that the note and deed of trust had been induced by a fraud-
ulent representation that the property had access to a highway or that there
had been a unilateral mistake of fact. The purchasers did not contend that
the sellers had told them that the property had access to the highway, but
asserted that they inferred there was access and that the sellers had failed
to correct their mistake.229 In considering the purchasers' allegation of
fraud, the court stated that to establish actionable fraud a party must prove
that: (1) a material representation was made; (2) it was false; (3) when the
representation was made the speaker knew it was false or that he made it
recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion;
(4) the speaker made the representation with the intent that it should be
acted upon by the party; (5) the party acted in reliance upon the represen-
tation; and (6) the party thereby suffered injury.23° The record demon-
strated that the first three elements were missing in this case, because the
sellers had not represented that the property had access to the highway.
Moreover, there was no showing of a fiduciary or confidential relationship
between the parties to create a duty to disclose the absence of access. The
court imposed a duty to investigate upon a buyer in an arm's-length trans-
action:
[T]he party claiming fraud has a duty to use reasonable diligence in
protecting his own affairs. "In an arm's-length transaction the de-
frauded party must exercise ordinary care for the protection of his
own interests and is charged with knowledge of all facts which would
have been discovered by a reasonably prudent person similarly situ-
ated. And a failure to exercise reasonable diligence is not excused by
mere confidence in the honesty and integrity of the other party."23'
Nor did the purchasers show the necessary elements for equitable relief
on the ground of unilateral mistake of fact, that: (1) the mistake is of so
great a consequence that to enforce the contract as made would be uncon-
scionable; (2) the mistake relates to a material feature of the contract; (3)
228. 561 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
229. Id. at 211. There was evidence that one of the sellers told the purchasers that the
property did not have access to the highway, except through other property owned by one of
the purchasers. Id.
230. Id. at 210. See also Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 516 S.W.2d
138, 143 (Tex. 1974).
231. 561 S.W.2d at 212 (quoting Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex. 1962)).




the mistake must have been made regardless of the exercise of ordinary
care; and (4) the parties can be placed in status quo in the equity sense,
that is, recission must not result in prejudice to the other party except for
the loss of his bargain.232 The court stressed the requirement that the mis-
take not be the result of negligence, stating that a contract could not be
avoided on the ground of mistake of fact if it appeared that ignorance of
the facts resulted from carelessness, indifference, or inattention.2 33 Ac-
cordingly, the appellate court upheld the trial court's summary judgment
for the sellers.
In the second case, Lone Star Machinery Corp. v. Frankel,234 the court
held that the purchaser's numerous and comprehensive inspections of the
residence and review of building plans for the residence overcame misrep-
resentations in the broker's listing sheet as to the square footage, height of
ceilings, and materials and equipment used in the construction of the prop-
erty.235 The purchaser sued in fraud2 36 to recover the difference in the
value of the property as represented and the actual value of the property.
The purchaser's review of the plans, according to the court, was sufficient
to put the purchaser on notice of discrepancies between the plans and the
listing sheet, creating a duty of further inquiry. The inspections of the
house and the plans showed that the listing sheets were not relied upon.
237
In Neuhaus v. Kain238 the owners of undivided interests in various tracts
of land alleged fraud as a basis for avoiding specific performance of a con-
tract to sell the tract. The contract allowed the sellers to retain a one-half
interest in the mineral rights. The owners alleged that the purchaser's at-
torney had misrepresented to them that the contract would also include a
provision reserving to the sellers all rights to negotiate future mineral
leases. The attorney had discussed the reservation of leasing rights with
one of the owners, but the purchaser subsequently refused to add such a
provision to the contract. The jury found that the attorney did make this
representation to one of the owners, who was thereby induced to sign the
contract and who used his influence to persuade the other owners to sign
the contract.239 The court of civil appeals first ruled that extrinsic evidence
is admissible when there is a claim that a party was induced by fraud to
232. 561 S.W.2d at 213.
233. Id.
234. 564 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
235. Id. at 137.
236. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1968).
237. 564 S.W.2d at 138. The court quoted from M.L. Mayfield Petroleum Corp. v. Kelly,
450 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref d n.r.e.):
[N]o purchaser who relies on his own investigation may, successfully assert
that he relied upon representations made to him by his veidor. If a purchaser
makes a personal investigation which is free and unhampered and the condi-
tions are such that he must obtain the information he desires, he is presumed
to rely upon his own investigation rather than on representations made to him
by his vendor.
238. 557 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
239. Id. at 129-30.
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enter into a written contract. 240 The court also acknowledged that a fraud-
ulent representation can be indirectly made by making it to one person
with the intent that it be repeated to another,24 ' but held that in this case
there was no pleading or evidence that the representation by the pur-
chaser's attorney was made or repeated to any of the other owners. Ac-
cordingly, the court ordered specific performance of the contract against
all of the owners except the one owner to whom the misrepresentation had
been made directly and who was thereby induced to sign the contract.242
Waiver of a misrepresentation as to the number of acres conveyed was
the issue before the court in B & R Development, Inc. v. Rogers.24 3 The
jury found that the purchaser, B & R Development, had relied upon the
seller's representation that the tract contained 90 acres, but that only 83.31
acres were actually conveyed to it. Nevertheless, after learning of the acre-
age shortage subsequent to the conveyance, the purchaser renewed and
extended the purchase money note.24" The appellate court recited the
well-settled Texas law: "Where one with knowledge of a fraud perpetrated
on him in a prior transaction executes a renewal of his obligation, he
thereby ratifies the original transaction and will not be permitted to plead
the fraud. ' 245 The court further held that although a purchaser can re-
ceive a set off or recover damages when an acreage deficiency is discov-
ered, in this case there was no evidence of a mutual mistake and the
purchaser's renewal of the note waived any deception.246
Several issues involving warranties and representations in the sale of a
new residence were considered in MacDonald v. Mobley.2 4 7 First, the
builder was held to have breached his agreement to change the carpet
before the closing of the sale. That breach was compounded by post-clos-
ing misrepresentations made by the builder that the carpet would be
changed as promised and that other defects would be corrected. These
post-closing misrepresentations were held to be a violation of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practice Act,248 because they occurred after the effective
date of the statute. Second, the builder's failure to construct the residence
in a good and workmanlike manner in thirty respects was a breach of the
implied warranty of fitness arising from the sale of new houses adopted in
Humber v. Morton.249 The builder argued that the contract provision that
the property would be conveyed "in the same condition as it is on this date,
reasonable wear and tear excepted" was effective to exclude any express or
implied warranty, but because the language was not conspicuous, the court
240. Id. at 132.
241. Id. at 138.
242. Id.
243. 561 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
244. Id. at 641.
245. Id. at 642.
246. Id. at 643.
247. 555 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
248. Id. at 919. Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
249. 426 S.W.2d 554, 561-62 (Tex. 1968).
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held that the disclaimer did not satisfy the requirements of section 2.316(b)
of the Texas Business and Commerce Code.25°
The applicable statute of limitations period for an implied warranty of
fitness in the construction of a new residence was the issue before the court
in Richman v. Watel.21' Richman purchased a new residence from the
builder, Watel, in 1965. In 1974 the floor in the front of the residence
collapsed. Richman sued the builder for damages and for loss in market
value on the theory that the residence was not constructed in a good and
workmanlike manner. Watel based his defense on the four-year statute of
limitations252 and on a limitation of warranty. The builder's written war-
ranty was limited to defective conditions that arose within one year after
the sale and provided that there were no other warranties.2 3 Reversing a
summary judgment for the builder, the appellate court held that the
builder's written warranty did not limit the implied warranty that the
house was constructed in a good and workmanlike manner and was suita-
ble for human habitation. The court further observed that the breach of
the implied warranty is a tort rather than a breach of contract. Accord-
ingly, the four-year statute of limitations for a breach of contract did not
apply; instead the court held that "plaintiffs' cause of action accrues and
the statute of limitation begins to run when damages are sustained, here
when the floor collapsed."'254
MacDonald and Richman suggest that the implied warranty of fitness in
the construction of a new residence can be waived if the disclaimer com-
ports with the disclaimer requirements of section 2.316 of the Texas Busi-
ness and Commerce Code. Although section 2.316 is not applicable to a
sale of a residence,255 it provides a convenient analogy to use in measuring
the effectiveness of a disclaimer of a warranty in such a sale.256 Section
2.316 permits the exclusion of an implied warranty of fitness if it is (1) in
writing, (2) conspicuous, and (3) plainly excluded by words like "as is" or
"with all faults." In addition, section 2.316(c)(2) states that if the buyer
has examined the "goods" as fully as desired or has refused to examine
them, then there is no implied warranty with regard to defects that the
250. 555 S.W.2d at 919. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968). The purported disclaimer was not printed in large or contrasting type or in any other
manner to cause a reasonable person against whom it was to operate to notice it. "Conspic-
uous" is defined in TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(10) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
Arguably the language here would not have been an effective disclaimer of the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness even if it had been conspicuous.
251. 565 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
252. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (Vernon 1958).
253. 565 S.W.2d at 102.
254. Id. at 103.
255. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.102, .105(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
256. The language of § 2-311 of the Uniform Land Transactions Act (amended 1977)
follows that of §2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Unlike the UCC provisions, how-
ever, under § 2-311 of the Uniform Land Transactions Act, a general disclaimer in terms
such as "as is" is not effective with respect to the purchaser of a residence, but the seller can
disclaim liability for specific defects or failure to comply with applicable law. This Act,
which has not been adopted in Texas, is summarized in Report of Special Committee, Sum-
mary of the Uniform Land Transactions Act, 13 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 672 (1978).
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examination should have revealed. Even if the implied warranty of fitness
is disclaimed in the manner prescribed in section 2.316, the seller may nev-
ertheless be vulnerable in three other respects. First, if all of article 2 of
the Texas Business and Commerce Code is applied to the sale of real prop-
erty, even by analogy, every contract and clause is thereby subject to the
defense of unconscionability. 7 Second, if an implied warranty of fitness
falls within the scope of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act,258 can
the warranty be waived or disclaimed? Section 17.50 of the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act specifically provides a remedy to consumers who have
been adversely affected by the breach of an express or implied warranty.
25 9
Section 17.42 of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act provides that a "waiver
by a consumer of the provisions of [the Act] is contrary to public policy
and is unenforceable and void.,,26" The unresolved question is whether
the policy against waiver of provisions of the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act precludes a disclaimer of warranty. The better reasoning is that the
implied warranty of fitness can be waived; if it has been effectively waived
and disclaimed, then it never existed and therefore cannot be breached
within the meaning of section 17.50 of the Act.26 Third, a waiver or dis-
claimer may be ineffective with respect to a breach that is also a violation
of a housing code requirement.262
6. Constructive Trust
In Austin Lake Estates, Inc. v. Meyer 263 the purchaser of a recreational
lot sued Austin Lake Estates for damages and alternatively for the imposi-
tion of a constructive trust. The deed to Meyer was not recorded, and
Austin Lake Estates subsequently conveyed the property to a second pur-
chaser, Winter, who was unaware of the prior conveyance to Meyer. The
seller contended that there could be no constructive trust because there
was no showing of a breach of a fiduciary or confidential relationship. The
court rejected this contention, and held that "[ilt is not essential for the
application of this doctrine [of constructive trust] that an actual trust or
fiduciary relationship exist, for when one party has wrongfully taken the
property of another and sold to a third party, the constructive trust will
follow the property or its proceeds." 2" Thus, Meyer was entitled to re-
cover from the seller the proceeds it had received from the sale of the lot to
Winter. Although the recovery of damages was barred by the two-year
257. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
258. Id. §§ 17.44, .45, .50(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
259. Id. § 17.50(a)(2).
260. Id. § 17.42.
261. See Note, Implied Warranties Can They Still Be Waived in Texas, 26 BAYLOR L.
REV. 440 (1974).
262. See Levine, The Warranty of Habitability, 2 CONN. L. REV. 61, 72-77 (1969). See
generally Kessler, Contracts ofAdhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943). See also text accompanying notes 464-76 in part IV of this
Article, infra, discussing Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978), and the implied
warranty of habitability.
263. 557 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
264. Id. at 382.
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statute of limitations,265 the court held that the suit for constructive trust
was subject to the four-year statute of limitations266 and was not barred.267
7. Liability to Seller of Purchaser Who Assumes Mortgage
Farina v. Calvary Hill Cemetery26 8 involved a suit to rescind a sale and
lease of an apartment project. Calvary Hill Cemetery sold Farina the im-
provements and leased him the land on which the improvements were lo-
cated. The improvements were to revert to Calvary Hill Cemetery at the
end of the lease. In addition to his agreement to pay rentals for the lease
of the land, Farina paid $50,000 cash, executed a $100,000 note, agreed to
make $50,000 in improvements, and assumed the balance of a $3,650,000
first lien note to Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Calvary Hill
Cemetery later agreed to release Farina from any personal liability to pay
the ground rentals. When Farina defaulted in the payment of the first lien
note, Metropolitan foreclosed upon the land and improvements. Farina
alleged that the sale and lease should be rescinded because there was an
oral agreement that he would have no personal liability on his agreement
to pay the first lien note, but such a provision was omitted from the written
contract documents. The court rejected Farina's argument.169 There is a
legal presumption that a written agreement contains an accurate expres-
sion of the prior oral negotiations. Unless trickery or artifice is shown, a
party cannot avoid the consequences of the written agreement on the
ground that he did not know what he was signing. The court held that
Farina was liable for breach of his agreement to assume the payment of
the first lien note. Since there was no contractual method for determining
damages, Calvary Hill Cemetery could recover the value of its reversion-
ary interest lost through the foreclosure; that is, the difference between the
reasonable cash market value of the land and improvements and the bal-
ance of the first lien note at the time of the foreclosure.27°
In Bentley v. Andrewartha27 1 admission of parol evidence was allowed to
show matters not mentioned in the deed. The court held that it was not
necessary in a suit involving the original parties to a deed to allege fraud,
accident, or mistake in order to introduce extrinsic evidence to show the
true consideration for the conveyance when the deed recited ten dollars
and other valuable consideration. Parol evidence could also be introduced
to show that the grantee agreed to assume and pay an encumbrance that
was not mentioned in the deed.27 2
8. Sale and Leaseback-Taxation
In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States273 the United States Supreme Court
265. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon 1958).
266. Id. art. 5529.
267. 557 S.W.2d at 383.
268. 566 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ refd n.r.c.).
269. Id. at 652.
270. Id. at 652-53.
271. 565 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
272. Id. at 592.
273. 98 S. Ct. 1291, 55 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1978).
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held that an attempted sale and leaseback by a bank was not merely an
elaborate financing transaction, but was a valid sale and lease. Pursuant to
the agreement, the rent to be paid equaled the lessor's mortgage payments,
and the lessee had an option to repurchase the building at various times
and at prices equal to the mortgage balance, plus the lessor's initial invest-
ment and six percent annual interest. Accordingly the lessor could depre-
ciate the building and deduct the interest paid on its mortgage and other
expenses incurred in the transaction. The court stated that as long as the
lessor has significant and genuine attributes of a traditional lessor, the
form of the transaction will govern. If, however, the sale-leaseback has no
economic substance, but is merely a sham device to achieve tax benefits,
the form will be ignored.274 Several facts supported the validity of the
transaction. Banking regulations precluded the bank's ownership of the
building, the lessor was not in the financing business and had a legitimate
reason to diversify its investments, the rental rate and option price were
reasonable, and the lessor incurred substantial liability and risk under the
transaction.275 If the lessee rather than the lessor had obtained the financ-
ing for the improvements, Helvering v. F & R. Lazarus & Co. 276 would
have applied, which would have characterized the transaction as a financ-
ing arrangement with title retained in the lessee. Lyon establishes no read-
ily ascertainable criteria for determining when the court will consider a
transaction a true sale-leaseback and when it will be considered a mere
financing arrangement. Each case will have to be determined on its own
facts. The multi-factor analysis of Lyon gives courts some indication of
which facts need to be considered, but it does not assign weight to be
given to those factors to aid the court in balancing.277
B. Brokerage
In Kaufhold t. Curtis & Ewing2 78 a real estate brokerage partnership en-
tered into an exclusive agency listing agreement 279 with the property own-
er, Kaufhold. The listing, given on January 4, 1967, was for a term of two
years "and thereafter until sold or terminated."28 The owner could termi-
nate the listing in writing and by payment of a surveyor's fee that had been
paid by the broker. The property was sold in 1971 through another broker.
Because the owner had failed to terminate the 1967 listing agreement, the
274. Id. at 1298, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 561.
275. Id. at 1303, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 566-67.
276. 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
277. For a general discussion of the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Lyon, see
Zarrow & Gordon, Supreme Court's Sale-Leaseback Decision in Lyon Lists Multile Criteria,
48 J. TAX. 42 (1978). See also Kaster, Another View of the Implications of the Supreme
Court's Decision in Lyon, 48 J. TAX. 44 (1978).
278. 557 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, no writ).
279. An exclusive agency listing is one under which the owner agrees that the listing
agent will be the exclusive agent and agrees to pay that agent the commission even if the
property is sold through another broker.
280. 557 S.W.2d at 335-36.
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court held that the brokerage firm was entitled to a commission on the
1971 sale."' The holding in Kauhold should be a reminder to sellers to be
certain any listing agreement has a definite termination date. Presumably
Kaufhold had to pay a real estate commission to both brokers. Kaufhold
also argued that the brokerage partnership itself was required to have a
real estate license, but the court correctly held that the fact that the indi-
vidual partners were licensed was sufficient. 2 ' On the other hand, the
Texas Supreme Court held in Coastal Plains Development Corp. v. Micrea,
Inc. 283 that a corporation must have its own real estate license in order to
comply with the Real Estate License Act;284 the fact that its president was
a licensed broker was insufficient. Micrea argued that it had complied
with the Act by obtaining a license after the contract was made and that it
held the license during the time period that the lost profits arose. The
court nevertheless construed the Act to require licensing at the time the
services were commenced.285
Article 6573a requires a real estate broker to advise the purchaser in
writing to have an abstract covering the property examined by an attorney
selected by the purchaser or to obtain an owner policy of title insurance.2 86
The failure of brokers to provide this written notice resulted in loss of
commissions in two recent significant decisions. In Jones v. DelAndersen &
Associates,287 discussed in the 1977 Real Property Article,288 the Texas
Supreme Court held that the notice requirements in article 6573a apply in
all situations, regardless of who pays the commission, whether the pur-
chaser is represented by an attorney, or whether there is a separate listing
agreement. 289 The purchaser in Del Andersen & Associates had received
no notice under article 6573a. In Albright v. Texcellere Corp. 290 the broker
gave no written notice under article 6573a, but argued that the notice was
not required in this case because the contract specifically required that the
purchaser be furnished with an owner policy of title insurance. The appel-
late court in Albright relied upon Del Andersen & Associates in holding
that the broker could not recover the commission, despite the fact that at
281. Id. at 336.
282. Id. at 335.
283. 572 S.W.2d 285, 288-89 (Tex. 1978). Other issues decided in this case are discussed
in text accompanying notes 315-20 infra.
284. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
285. 572 S.W.2d at 288-89; see Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 318 (1977).
286. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) provides as
follows:
When an offer to purchase real estate in this state is signed, the real estate
broker or salesman shall advise the purchaser or purchasers, in writing, that
the purchaser or purchasers should have the abstract covering the real estate
which is the subject of the contract examined by an attorney of the purchaser's
own selection, or that the purchaser or purchasers should be furnished with or
obtain a policy of title insurance. Failure to advise the purchaser as provided
in this subsection precludes the payment of or recovery of any commission
agreed to be paid on the sale.
287. 539 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1976).
288. Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 5, at 52-53.
289. 539 S.W.2d at 350-51.
290. 561 S.W.2d 533, 539-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1979]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
least one objective of the statute, title protection through a title policy, was
accomplished by the contract for the sale of the property. Article 6573a
literally requires that the broker give the full written notice to the pur-
chaser at the time of the execution of the contract for the sale of the prop-
erty. If the statute is to be read as strictly as it was read in A/bright, it is
uncertain whether the broker complies with article 6573a by including the
required notice in the listing agreement with the purchaser, but not giving
it again when the contract for the sale is signed. Even this opportunity
seldom arises, since most real estate listing agreements are between the
seller and the broker, although in Albright the purchaser was paying the
broker's commission. How can the broker give the notice if the seller and
purchaser negotiate and sign their own contract for the sale of the prop-
erty? Both DelAndersen & Associates and A/bright suggest the answer. In
Del Andersen & Associates the Texas Supreme Court stated that the only
exception to article 6573a occurs when the broker is wrongfully deprived
of the opportunity to comply with the notice requirement. 29 The court
cited Knight v. Hicks292 for this exception. In Knight v. Hicks the court
held that the article 6573a notice applies "where the broker charged with
the obligation to give such notice has an opportunity to participate in or be
present at the execution of the contract of sale"; 29 3 but that he will not be
denied recovery of the commission "if he is precluded from doing so by the
act of the seller in dealing directly with the buyer., 294 In A/bright there
was evidence that the broker was present when the contract for the sale
was signed and thus was not deprived of an opportunity to comply with
the statute.295 To avoid an issue as to whether there was opportunity to
give the article 6573a notice, a broker should deliver a separate notice to
the purchaser at the earliest opportunity and urge the attorney who
prepares the contract to insert the notice in the contract. If the broker signs
a contract for the sale of the property that does not contain the notice, a
separate notice from the broker is critical to his right to recover the com-
mission. Although a notice given to the purchaser after the contract is
signed would not suffice, denying the broker the recovery of a commission
on this basis seems harsh if the purchaser receives the same protection that
could have been afforded through the broker's notice; that is, if the con-
tract requires that a title report be furnished for the purchaser's review and
that an owner policy of title insurance be furnished to the purchaser.
Albright suggests an alternative remedy that may be available to the bro-
ker who cannot recover the commission due to noncompliance with article
6573a. In Albright the broker sued for the $250,000 commission the pur-
chaser had agreed to pay if the purchase of the office building was consum-
mated, and for $350,000 in damages for the loss of the broker's exclusive
right to resell the building. The purchaser refused to complete the sale on
291. 539 S.W.2d at 351.
292. 505 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
293. Id. at 643-44.
294. Id. at 644.
295. 561 S.W.2d at 540.
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the ground that the building encroached on city property. The jury, how-
ever, found that the purchaser agreed to accept the encroachment if the
city council issued a permit to use the area of the encroachment.2 96 If it
had not been for the failure to give the article 6573a notice, the broker
could have recovered the commission under the general principle that the
failure to fulfill a condition precedent will not defeat the recovery of the
commission if the condition is not fulfilled due to the default of the bro-
ker's principal. Thus, the broker had two theories of recovery against the
purchaser: one for the real estate commission, and one for damages based
upon the breach of contract by the purchaser. The court in Albright distin-
guished the second remedy: "In such instances the broker's cause of action
is not to recover the commission promised to him but to recover damages
for the principal's breach of the contract." '297 Nevertheless, the damages
remedy was asserted only with regard to the broker's exclusive right to
resell the property, a point that the broker had waived procedurally.
Could the broker have recovered damages on the basis of the purchaser's
failure to complete the sale, even though a commission could not be recov-
ered?
What effect does a sale of real property have upon the real estate bro-
ker's right to receive a monthly commission on a lease of the property?
Clearly the seller-lessor remains liable, but does the purchaser have any
liability? The general rule is that unless the purchaser expressly assumes
the commission obligation, the purchaser has no obligation to pay the bro-
ker the commission.298 In Dauley v. First National Bank299 a real estate
broker sued a bank, which had purchased a shopping center at a foreclo-
sure sale, to recover a leasing commission. Dauley, the broker, had ob-
tained a major long term tenant for the former owner of the shopping
center, and had received the agreed monthly leasing commission for a
number of months prior to the foreclosure. The foreclosure sale was con-
ducted pursuant to a deed of trust lien against the property, which had
been executed after the agreement to pay the leasing commission was
made. After the foreclosure sale the bank refused to pay Dauley any fur-
ther commissions. The court held that the former owner's agreement to
pay the leasing commission was not a covenant running with the land and
did not obligate the bank to pay the leasing commission, even though the
bank had accepted the trustee's deed subject to the lease. 300 Even a provi-
sion in the lease that the agreement to pay the leasing commission was
binding upon the landlord and its successors and assigns would not have
bound the bank because such a personal covenant does not constitute a
covenant running with the land."' The court stated:
296. Id. at 538.
297. Id. at 541.
298. See Groot, Equitable Enforcement of Deferred Brokerage Commissions, 51 TEXAS L.
REV. 76, 77 (1972).
299. 565 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).




Where lease provided that landlord agreed to pay undersigned agent
commission for negotiating lease or renewals thereof and in the event
of assignment, landlord, his assigns, successors and heirs would be
liable or all agent's commissions due under lease, promise was purely
for benefit of one having no interest in land and would not be en-
forced against successive owners of realty as a covenant running with
the land.
30 2
A real estate broker who is acting both as the seller's agent and as a
purchaser of the property owes the seller a duty to make no misstatements
concerning the transaction and to disclose fully and completely all mate-
rial facts known to him that might affect the seller.3" 3 A broker who
breaches this duty forfeits all compensation for those services and must
account for any profit or benefit received from the transaction; the seller
can also rescind or set the transaction aside, even if the broker shows that
the price and terms of the sale are fair. Nothing will defeat the seller's
remedy for a breach of fiduciary duty unless the seller consents in advance
to the arrangement or confirms the sale after full knowledge of the facts. 3°
In Ramsey v. Gordon30 5 the broker served as agent for the seller and as a
disclosed trustee for the purchaser. The seller gave notice that he would
not complete the sale, and approximately six weeks later, after employing
a new broker, sold the property to another person for the same price and
approximately the same down payment but on more favorable terms for
payment of the balance of the price. The broker sued both the seller and
the new brokers who had assisted the seller in the second sale for lost com-
missions and lost profits from the resale of the property.3 6 The seller an-
swered that the broker had fraudulently breached the duty owed to him by
failing to secure the highest price obtainable and known to the broker,
although the seller later sold the property for the same price. The court,
however, based its decision in favor of the seller on general agency princi-
ples: "Whenever an agent breaches his duty to his principal by becoming
personally interested . . . , the contract is voidable at the election of the
principal without full knowledge of all of the facts surrounding the agent's
interest.307 The full knowledge required in Ramsey obviously was not the
broker's interest in the purchase of the property, since that was disclosed in
the contract; rather it was the broker's undisclosed knowledge that the
property could be resold immediately for a substantial profit.
Real estate brokers who have a proprietary interest in the sale may be
asked by the seller to defer a portion of their commission until some por-
302. 565 S.W.2d at 348 (summarizing Blasser v. Cass, 158 Tex. 560, 562, 314 S.W.2d 807,
809 (1958)).
303. Anderson v. Griffith, 501 S.W.2d 695, 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ
refd n.r.e.) (quoting Allison v. Harrison, 137 Tex. 582, 588, 156 S.W.2d 137, 140 (1941))
(undisclosed participation in the purchase of the property). Anderson is discussed in Wal-
lenstein, Properly, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 29, 42 (1975).
304. Anderson v. Griffith, 501 S.W.2d 695, 700, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973,
writ refd n.r.e.); see Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 5, at 57.
305. 567 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
306. The broker had contracted to resell the property at a substantial profit. Id. at 870.
307. d. at 871.
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tion of the deferred consideration is paid. In Morris v. Jordan Financial
Corp.308 the broker, who was also the initial purchaser, assigned the
purchase contract to a third party, Kallay. The seller agreed to pay the
broker corporation a six percent real estate commission, half of which was
paid by the delivery of a $50,164.49 promissory note payable only if the
first payment on the purchase money note was made. 30 9 Kallay and the
seller, Morris, later modified the purchase money note to provide for the
first payment to include principal and interest rather than interest alone.
The broker did not agree to the modification. The first payment under the
modified purchase money note was made, but the seller refused to pay the
commission note, arguing that the payment made under the modified note,
even though in the same amount as specified under the original note, did
not satisfy the condition precedent of receiving the full first payment as
interest under the original note.3"' The court held that the broker was
entitled to be paid on the commission note for two reasons. First, the com-
mission note only required that the first payment on the purchase money
note be made, and it was irrelevant that the note was modified to include
in that payment principal and interest instead of interest alone. Second,
the seller could not avoid the obligation to pay the commission note
merely by changing the terms of payment of the purchase money note
without the broker's consent. 3 " The final issue decided by the court was
the allegation that the broker had interfered with the contractual relation-
ship between Kallay and the seller and escrow agent by threatening suit
against Kallay and the escrow agent. The court rejected this allegation,
stating that "one is privileged to interfere with a contract between others
when he does so in the bona fide exercise of his own rights or when he
possesses an equal or superior interest to that of the plaintiff in the subject
matter., 312
Finally, in Kilgore v. Texas Real Estate Commission3 13 the court upheld
308. 564 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
309. To avoid having such a promissory note treated for tax purposes as the payment of
the full commission in the year the note is delivered, the note should also provide that the
note is not payment of the commission, but only evidences the indebtedness, and that the
payment of the note is conditioned upon the purchaser's performance of his obligation. See
Jay A. Williams, 28 T.C. 1000 (1957); Robert J. Dial, 24 T.C. 117 (1955). See generally
Brandis, Is the Receipt of a Promissory Note the Same as Cashfor Federal Income Tax Pur-
poses?, 3 TAX. FOR LAW. 8 (1974). If the payment to the broker is conditioned upon receipt
of payment from the purchaser, the broker may require assurance that the seller will use
reasonable efforts to collect payments from the purchaser and will not change the manner of
these payments. See generally Groot, supra note 298, passim.
310. 564 S.W.2d at 182.
311. Id. at 183 (citing Stitt v. Royal Park Fashions, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.)), discussed in Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note 1, at
6T See also Adams v. Johnson, 298 S.W. 265, 267 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt
adopted) (broker who had agreed to be paid his commission out of deferred note payments
from the sale of land entitled to the balance of his commission despite the cancellation of the
note and reconveyance of the land); Don Drum Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 465 S.W.2d 409,
411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, no writ). See generally Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 1171 (1974).
See further Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 5, at 56-57.
312. 564 S.W.2d at 184.
313. 565 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
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the suspension of a broker's real estate license on the ground that the bro-
ker interpleaded the escrow deposit delivered to the broker after the Texas
Real Estate Commission notified the broker to refund the deposit to either
the seller or purchaser. The court held that there was substantial evidence
to support the finding that the broker had violated the Real Estate License
Act by "'failing within a reasonable time properly to account for or remit
money coming into his possession which belongs to others.' ,,314
C. Joint Ventures and Partnerships
1. Definition of a Joint Venture
The Texas Supreme Court outlined the elements of a joint venture in
Coastal Plains Development Corp. v. Micrea, Inc.315 to include: (1) an
agreement, express or implied, to form a joint venture; (2) a community of
interest in the venture; (3) an agreement to share in profits; (4) an agree-
ment to share in losses; and (5) a mutual right of control or management of
the venture.31 6 The case involved a breach of contract suit brought by a
land developer against the owner of the land. Because the land developer
corporation, Micrea, was not properly licensed under the Real Estate Li-
cense Act,3t 7 it could not enforce its suit for compensation unless it could
demonstrate that the relationship was exempt from the Act as a joint ven-
ture. While the agreement between the parties expressly provided that the
relationship was not to be considered as a joint venture, the appellate court
had disregarded this in finding the existence of a joint venture.3 '8 The
Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, reciting the general
rule that the courts will give effect to the intent expressed by the parties in
a contract, unless the facts show that the arrangement was different than
expressed.3t 9 Micrea argued that the following facts demonstrated an in-
tent to form a joint venture: (1) an agreement to share in profits; (2) a
provision in the agreement requiring joint approval and execution of con-
tracts concerning the development of the property; and (3) advertising that
referred to the development as a joint venture between the parties. The
court found that advertising was not persuasive and, further, that no party
claimed that the advertising had been relied upon to work an estoppel.
The court, however, was persuaded by the absence of any agreement to
share in losses, which it held to be essential to the existence of a joint
venture.32°
314. Id. at 116; see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 15(4)(E) (Vernon Supp.
1978-79).
315. 572 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1978).
316. Id. at 287.
317. See text accompanying notes 283-85 supra.
318. Coastal Plains Dev. Corp. v. Micrea, Inc., 553 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1977), rev'd, 572 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1978). The appellate court's decision is discussed in
Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note 1, at 101-02.
319. 572 S.W.2d at 287.
320. Id. at 288. The appellate court had, strangely, found that a sharing of losses was
implied from an agreement to share profits. 553 S.W.2d 816, 818. On this point, see A.
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2. Interests in Joint Ventures and Limited Partnerships as Securities
A case discussed in the 1978 Real Property Article, McConathy v. Dal
Mac Commercial Real Estate, Inc. ,321 held that an interest in a joint ven-
ture is not an investment contract or a certificate in a profit-sharing or
participation agreement, and, therefore, is not a security under the Texas
Securities Act .322 The court based its conclusion upon a finding that the
venturers were not relying solely or substantially upon the efforts of others
for their expectation of profit.323 Presumably the court felt that a member
of a joint venture has a voice in the management of the venture and would
not be relying solely or substantially upon the efforts of others. Such a
distinction would not exempt every joint venture, however, because many
joint venture agreements centralize the management in one or a few of the
venturers.
A limited partnership interest, on the other hand, is a security as a mat-
ter of law,3 24 and is subject to applicable fraud provisions of federal and
state securities laws, even though in some circumstances it may be exempt
from registration and other requirements of the securities laws. In Bridgen
v. Scott325 some of the limited partners filed suit to rescind the purchase of
their interests in the limited partnership on the ground that the federal
securities laws3 26 had been violated. The essence of the plaintiffs' suit was
that the general partner misrepresented that he would not also participate
as a limited partner, that the purchase of the property would be a short-
term investment, and that he had failed to disclose a second "sale" that
had the effect of providing 100% financing on the property to the partner-
ship. After formation of the limited partnership, the general partner ac-
quired a fifty-five percent interest in the partnership, but as an assignee
rather than as a new limited partner. Following a general decline in the
economy a short time later, the general partner recommended to the lim-
ited partners that no further funds be invested in the property.327 The
court's reasoning in disallowing rescission is difficult to follow, but the
court obviously was persuaded by the fact that the general partner's
purchase of the interest was later disclosed to the limited partners, that the
limited partners could have concluded from the partnership documents
that there was a substantial chance that the investment in the property
might be a total loss, and that the general partner had made a significant
BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 14(e), at 72 (1968); Comment, Joint
Adventures-The Sharing of Losses Dilemma, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 429 (1963).
321. 545 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ). See Goodman v. Ep-
stein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978), discussed in text accompanying notes 332-37 infra and
Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note 1, at 99-100.
322. 545 S.W.2d at 875-76; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4A (Vernon 1964).
323. 545 S.W.2d at 875.
324. See Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note 1, at 99 n.554.
325. 456 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
326. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77 (1976); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, §§ 10(b), 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 8j, 78z (1976).
327. 456 F. Supp. at 1057.
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effort to find a purchaser for the property. 328 The determinative issue,
however, appears to have been the substantial tax shelter the limited part-
ners derived from their investments in the partnership.329 The court held
that the tax benefits had to be considered in determining the loss, if any,
suffered by the limited partners, and since there was no evidence as to their
actual loss, there was no way to place the plaintiffs in the same position
they would have been if they had not purchased the limited partnership
interests.330 The court was also persuaded by the sophistication of the lim-
ited partners and their representatives, their failure to complain immedi-
ately after learning of the general partner's purchase of the interest in the
partnership, and the court's belief that the limited partners could have
learned, or at least could have surmised, some of the undisclosed facts
from a thorough reading of the information distributed by the general
partner. 3
The Bridgen decision should be compared with the recent Seventh Cir-
cuit decision in Goodman v. Epstein.3 32 The plaintiffs in Goodman were
limited partners who purchased interests in a partnership that was orga-
nized for the purpose of developing a residential subdivision. The devel-
opment was later abandoned after the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency refused to grant a permit to the developer. Despite this refusal, the
general partner made a call upon the limited partners for another capital
contribution, without disclosing the snag in the development plans.33 3 The
plaintiffs sued for damages, alleging violations of the federal securities
laws, common law fraud, and breach of the fiduciary responsibility owed
by the general partner to the limited partners. The court held that a lim-
ited partnership organized under the Illinois Uniform Limited Partnership
Act 334 has all the elements of a security: (1) an investment in a common
enterprise, (2) premised on a reasonable expectation of profits, (3) to be
derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.335 The
court also held that even though the limited partners may have invested
for the initial benefits of tax deductions, this evidence
would not compel a conclusion that the investors had insufficient ex-
pectation of eventual profit to meet the "reasonable expectation of
profit" requirement. The probability of initial "tax losses" does noth-
ing to change the underlying legal nature of the limited partnership
interest nor to disturb the basic common sense presumption that busi-
ness ventures are entered into for profit. 3 6
328. Id. at 1056.
329. Id. at 1061-62.
330. Id. at 1058.
331. Id. at 1052-54.
332. 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978).
333. Id. at 393.
334. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106/2, §§ 44-73 (Smith-Hurd 1952).
335. 582 F.2d at 406 (citing United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852
(1975)).
336. 582 F.2d at 407.
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The court further held that while the nondisclosure of the permit refusal
came after the initial investment in the partnership,
when an investment decision remained to be made at the time of a call
for a capital contribution by a Limited Partner. . . , the contribution
by each Limited Partner in response to the call constituted a separate
"purchase" of a security and, therefore, any material representations
or omissions at that time were "in connection with the purchase or
sale" of a security, as required by § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.3 37
3. Effect of Failure to File Certificate on Liability of Limited Partners
The Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act requires that a limited
partnership file a certificate of limited partnership with the secretary of
state.338 If the limited partners discover that the filing requirements of the
Act have not been met, they must promptly renounce their interests in the
profits of the business or other compensation, or risk becoming liable as
general partners.3 39 If the limited partners learn that no certificate has
been filed and fail to renounce their partnership interest, they may not
automatically become liable as general partners if the creditor who asserts
the liability knew that it was contracting with a purported limited partner-
ship, according to the holding in Garrett v. Koepke.34 ° In Garrett a credi-
tor of a partnership that owned a motel sued the limited partners to
recover the debt. No limited partnership certificate had been filed on be-
half of the partnership. The court held that the Texas Uniform Limited
Partnership Act is a notice statute and that since the creditor already knew
it was dealing with a limited partnership and understood the consequences
of dealing with such an entity, the failure to comply with the Act did not
subject the limited partners to liability for the debt.34' On the other hand,
the court appears to have recognized that the limited liability would have
been lost if the creditor had not known that it was dealing with a limited
partnership. The court also refused to hold the limited partners liable on a
debt that arose before the date the general partner resigned and the limited
partners became general partners by exercising control of the partnership
assets to effect distribution.342 Furthermore, it would seem that if a person
who believed himself to be a limited partner failed to renounce as required
in section 12 of the Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act after he
learned that no limited partnership certificate had been filed under the Act,
337. Id. at 414.
338. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 3 (Vernon 1970).
339. Id. § 12 provides as follows:
A person who has contributed to the capital of a business conducted by a
person or partnership erroneously believing that he has become a limited part-
ner in a limited partnership, is not, by reason of his exercise of the right of a
limited partner, a general partner with the person or in the partnership carry-
ing on the business, or bound by the obligations of such person or partnership;
provided that on ascertaining the mistake he promptly renounces his interest
in the profits of the business, or other compensation by way of income.
340. 569 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
341. Id. at 570.
342. Id. at 571.
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he would be liable as a general partner for debts subsequently incurred.
Nevertheless, Garrett appears to say that the liability would arise only with
respect to claims of creditors who did not believe they were dealing with a
limited partnership.343 In any event, Garrett does not suggest that a person
can escape liability merely by claiming to be a limited partner if there is no
substance to the claim.3'4
4. Breach of General Partner's Fiduciary Duty
In Watson v. Limited Partners of WCKT Ltd 34  the limited partners
sued the general partner to recover their capital investment in a partner-
ship organized to own and rent five fourplexes in Austin. The partnership
was unsuccessful, a receiver was appointed to manage the properties, and
when the properties were sold at foreclosure sale, the general partner
purchased the five fourplexes for himself. The jury found that in the oper-
ations of the partnership the general partner failed to manage the partner-
ship in the exercise of ordinary care, failed to act with the highest degree of
loyalty, fairness, candor, and good faith toward the limited partners, and
that his conduct was a proximate cause of damage to the limited part-
ners.346 The court stated that the general partner of a limited partnership,
as well as the managing partner of a general partnership, stands in a fiduci-
ary capacity and owes one of the highest duties recognized in the law.347
When this fiduciary relationship is violated, as it was in this case, the lim-
ited partners are entitled to restitution, although restitution may not be the
only remedy available to them. Noting the similarity between this case
and Russell P. Truitt,341 the court agreed with the holding in Russell that
once a breach of the fiduciary duty is shown, it is not necessary to deter-
mine whether the breach was the proximate cause of the damage to the
limited partners. 49
343. Id. at 570.
344. Seegenerall, A. BROMBERG, supra note 320, § 32. Compare Giles v. Vette, 263 U.S.
553, 562-63 (1924), in which the limited partners did renounce their interest and returned the
profits they had received from the partnership; the court stated: "The language [in the coun-
terpart to § 12 of the Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act] is comprehensive and covers
all cases where one has contributed to the capital of a business conducted by a partnership
or person erroneously believing that he is a limited partner." Id. at 563.
345. 570 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
346. Id. at 180.
347. Id. at 182.
348. 554 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court did
not consider, however, whether the limited partner, general partner relationship differs from
that between joint venturers and their agent.
349. 570 S.W.2d at 182.
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III. REAL ESTATE FINANCING AND DEVELOPMENT
by
Greg N. Martin *
A. Mortgages
1. Enforceability of Loan Commitments
Two cases during the survey period involved the enforceability of a loan
commitment by a party other than the original contemplated borrower. In
Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Lone Star Life Insurance Co. 350 the court fol-
lowed Republic National Bank v. National Bankers Life Insurance Co.,
holding that the interim lender attempting to enforce a permanent loan
commitment was not a third party beneficiary, and therefore had no stand-
ing to enforce the commitment for its benefit. Although the original com-
mitment letter stated that it was nontransferable, the permanent lender
had subsequently sent a clarifying letter to the interim lender stating that
the original borrower was not prevented from "banking the commitment
letter. 352 Subsequently, the original borrower assigned the commitment
letter to the interim lender, who attempted to enforce the commitment as
"an assignee for collateral purposes" rather than as a third party benefici-
ary; the interim lender further claimed that the permanent lender was es-
topped from relying upon the nontransferability clause in its original
commitment by reason of its subsequent clarification letter.353 The court,
however, held that absent a showing that the commitment was "clearly"
for the benefit of the interim lender, it had no standing to enforce the loan
commitment.354
In Guaranty Bank v. Lone Star Life Insurance Co. 3 11 the interim lender
did not have a problem of showing it was a third party beneficiary, but did
fail in its efforts to enforce a commitment due to its inability to deliver the
personal guaranty of the president of the original corporate borrower as
required by the commitment. An attempt to assign the guaranty of the
interim loan failed because the guarantor had received a discharge in
bankruptcy following the execution of the guaranty agreement.356
2. Liability of Guarantor of a Forged Promissory Note
In an effort to distinguish the recent Texas Supreme Court case of Uni-
* B.B.A., LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Hutcheson & Grundy, Hous-
ton, Texas.
350. 565 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
351. 427 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
352. The letter, however, immediately went on to state: "Stated differently, monies ad-
vanced to Mr. Hadsell [original borrower] secured by a first mortgage lien on the subject
property to which he has title is in no way intended to be excluded within the intent ofthe
non-transferability clause." 565 S.W.2d at 356.
353. Id. at 357.
354. Id. at 357-58.
355. 568 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
356. Id. at 433-34. But cf. Reece v. First State Bank, 566 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1978) (contin-
uing guarantor liable on forged note where indebtedness is adopted or ratified by corporate
debtor).
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versal Metals & Machinery, Inc. v. Bohart357 and thereby escape liability,
the guarantor in Reece v. First State Bank358 claimed that the guaranty
agreement he executed was a continuing guaranty of indebtedness of a
certain debtor, as opposed to the guaranty of a specific note that was
forged, as existed in the Bohart case. The facts disclosed that even though
the corporate note had been forged, the corporation had ratified its execu-
tion by receiving the benefit of the proceeds of the note and by having
made the payments for several months on the forged note. The Texas
Supreme Court extended the Bohart doctrine to include a continuing guar-
anty, provided that the forged note is shown to be a "corporate indebted-
ness" by adoption or ratification.
3. Acceleration of Maturity of Promissory Note
The operation of an optional acceleration clause was reviewed during
the survey period in Purnell v. Follett.359 The court distinguished prior
cases that had found waiver of notice provisions to be enforceable as
"clear and unequivocal," and held that an optional acceleration clause
containing a waiver of notice was not of sufficient clarity to constitute a
clear and unequivocal waiver. 360 The court drew a distinction between a
waiver of notice of intent to accelerate and a waiver of notice of foreclo-
sure sale, and found the latter was clearly waived in the instant case. 36 1
4. Foreclosures
Several cases were before the Texas courts involving various aspects of
nonjudicial foreclosures under deeds of trust. In Chambers v. Lee362 the
lender sued for a deficiency judgment following foreclosure, and the
debtor counterclaimed for damages. The debtor argued that the lender's
posting of public notices had been improper because one of the notices had
been posted on a telephone pole in violation of a city ordinance that pro-
hibited the posting of advertising on such poles. The utility pole was lo-
cated just outside the fire station where notices were normally posted. The
court overruled the debtor's contention, stating that the mere fact that the
illegal notice could be removed and the lender fined did not justify over-
turning the foreclosure proceeding.363 The court distinguished the case of
Topletz v. Thompson,364 which was relied upon by the debtor in arguing
357. 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976).
358. 566 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1978).
359. 555 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
360. Id. at 765. The waiver clause contained in the deed of trust stated that, upon de-
fault, the holder of the note "shall have the option to declare all of the indebtedness immedi-
ately due andpayable and without demand upon, or notice to, the Grantors, to foreclose the
lien of this Deed of Trust at Trustee's sale or otherwise." Id. at 764 (emphasis added by the
court).
361. Id. at 766.
362. 566 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
363. Id. at 73.
364. 342 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1960, no writ). In this case the jury had
also found that one place of posting was not a "public place" under the statute. Id. at 156.
The statute has since been amended to require "courthouse door" posting along with written
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that a notice, posted in violation of a city ordinance, is not posted in a
"public place" as contemplated by the statute.365
In Port City State Bank v. Leyco Construction Co. ,366 which involved an
appeal from a plea of privilege, the bank mistakenly posted for foreclo-
sure, but subsequently vacated when it discovered that some of the original
property had been released from its lien. The court was faced with the
argument that the bank had created a cause of action in favor of the bor-
rower by an "attempted" wrongful foreclosure. The court, however, held
that there was no cause of action, stating that no cases had been found
where a debtor had been damaged when a creditor mistakenly attempted
to, but did not actually, foreclose on the property.367
The Texas Supreme Court in Hammonds v. Holmes3 68 held that a sec-
ond suit for wrongful foreclosure, which for the first time joined as a party
the trustee under the deed of trust, was not barred by res judicata resulting
from a prior suit that had been dismissed with prejudice against the lender.
The court said that the trustee, also a vice-president of the defendant
lender bank, cannot, as a matter of law, act in the foreclosure as a bank
employee; therefore, the trustee was in insufficient privity with the bank to
justify dismissal on the grounds of resjudicata.3 69 The dissent stated there
was sufficient privity in that the interest of both the trustee and the bank
were closely connected and virtually identical.37 °
In Stergios v. Babcock,37 ' following a default, acceleration, and the post-
ing of a foreclosure notice, the holder of a note accepted a late interest
payment but continued with the foreclosure under the deed of trust. The
note contained a no personal liability clause that stated that in the event of
default, the sole and only remedy of the holder of the note was foreclosure.
Relying on this clause, the court ordered the holder of the note to return
the payment accepted after acceleration and posting, stating that the note-
holder had elected to pursue the exclusive remedy of foreclosure.372 Fi-
nally, in Cox v. Guaranty National Bank,3 73 the debtors sought temporarily
to enjoin a foreclosure sale. The court, however, was not persuaded by the
argument that the anticipated price to be obtained at the foreclosure sale
would be inadequate, and the injunction was therefore denied.374
notice to the debtor in lieu of the three public places requirement. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 3810 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
365. 566 S.W.2d at 73.
366. 561 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
367. Id. at 547.
368. 559 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. 1977).
369. Id. at 347.
370. Id. at 348 (McGee, J., dissenting).
371. 568 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
372. Id. at 708.
373. 565 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
374. Id. at 569-70. The debtor labelled the anticipated price as "prospective gross inade-
quacy." Id. at 569.
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B. Usury
During the survey period several important usury cases were decided by
the Texas Supreme Court. In Tanner Development Co. v. Ferguson375 a
purchaser of real property executed a nonrecourse note payable over a
five-year period. It was stipulated that the first year's interest was paid in
advance at the closing. Commencing with the first year, the purchaser was
to pay interest in advance in quarterly installments until the last year of
the note, when the interest prepaid at the closing would be applied and
credited. The note expressly provided that interest would cease in the
event of prepayment of principal and that any unearned prepaid interest
would be applied as a credit upon the principal. The maker defaulted on
the note. Both the note and the deed of trust contained savings clauses
37 6
similar to the one approved in Nevels v. Harris.37 7 The Texas Supreme
Court held that the "true" principal sum of the note was the amount stated
in the note and that, because the transaction was not a loan of money but a
sale of property, the amount of prepaid interest should not have been de-
ducted from the stated face amount of the note in arriving at the true prin-
cipal sum, as was done by the court of civil appeals.378 Both the trial court
and the court of civil appeals had utilized the spreading approach 37 9 in
testing whether the note was usurious. On appeal, however, the maker of
the note argued that, based on the decision in Commerce Trust Co. v.
Ramp,38° payment of more than ten percent interest in any one year would
make the transaction usurious, even though the total interest payments for
the entire period of the loan would not exceed the amount authorized by
law. Following a complete review of the case history of the two lines of
authority of Nevels and Ramp, the court expressly overruled the Ramp
doctrine to the extent it conflicted with its opinion and likewise disap-
proved of the conflicting holding of the court of civil appeals in Southwest-
ern Investment Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc.381 On the
motion for rehearing the court was careful to point out that its ruling only
applied to cases involving a sale of real property,382 not cash loan transac-
tions. In the case of a loan of money where a lender deducts interest, fees,
375. 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977).
376. Such savings clauses provide that any interest found to exceed the usury limits shall
be regarded as payment on the principal and so credited. Id. at 782 & n.4.
377. 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937).
378. 561 SW.2d at 782-83.
379. The spreading approach entails prorating the prepaid interest over the entire term
of the loan before the rate of interest is computed, rather than regarding it as all interest paid
in one year. See id. at 781-87.
380. 135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d 531 (1940).
381. 511 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ refdn.r.e per curiam, 516 S.W.2d
136 (Tex. 1974).
382. 561 S.W.2d at 787. The court also held that the court of civil appeals had correctly
overruled Tanner's argument that the interest paid by Ferguson was voluntary and was for
his personal convenience and tax benefit and, therefore, not usurious, in the following lan-
guage: "However, once the agreed terms have been reduced to writing in the form of a
compulsory contract, the test of alleged usury is not concerned with which party might have
originated the alleged usurious provisions." d. at 781.
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commissions, or other front-end charges, the court will continue to look to
the amount of dollars actually received or retained by the borrower in ar-
riving at the "true principal" sum.3 83
Less than six months after the Tanner case, the supreme court had occa-
sion to decide a usury case involving a loan of money from which the bank
had required that a certain portion of the loan proceeds be placed on de-
posit for the purpose of paying accrued interest. In First State Bank v.
Miller,38 4 a note for $70,000, payable in three years, with interest payable
annually at ten percent per annum, was executed by the maker. At the
time the note was executed, and as a condition to the loan, $14,000 of the
proceeds was required to be deposited with the bank under an "escrow" or
"freeze" for payment of the first two years' interest. The court held that
the Nevels's doctrine of spreading was applicable to the three year note yet,
as pointed out in Tanner, the "true" principal sum of the note was $56,000,
which provided a maximum lawful yield on that amount for three years of
$16,800, instead of the $21,000 contracted for and charged by the bank.38 5
With regard to the remedy and amount of recovery, the supreme court
was divided six to three on the interpretation of articles 5069-1.04386 and
5069-1.06.387 The note called for the first interest payment of $7,000 in
1973, which was paid out of the "escrow," leaving a balance of $7,000 in
escrow. Before the 1974 interest payment was due, suit was filed, and dur-
ing the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff paid into the registry of the court
$7,000 for interest due in 1975, and paid directly to the bank the principal
sum of $70,000. The court of civil appeals held that the plaintiff was enti-
tled to a judgment for penalties in the sum of $42,000, twice the $21,000
usurious interest that was contracted for, plus recovery of the $7,000 on
deposit with the court, the $7,000 frozen in the borrower's bank account,
together with an additional $14,000 for interest theretofor paid to the bank.
The supreme court followed the holding of the court of civil appeals, ex-
cept with respect to the $14,000 for interest previously paid to the bank.
The lengthy dissenting opinion objected to the inequities that would result
from the majority's view, depending upon whether interest had actually
been paid prior to the institution of the suit.388
383. Id. at 787.
384. 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978).
385. Id. at 575. This "true" principal sum was derived by subtracting the escrowed de-
posits from the stated principal.
386. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04 (Vernon 1971).
387. Id. art. 5069-1.06.
388. The dissent expressed its views in the following language:
The lender who exacts payment of all or part of the usurious interest places
himself in the position of being, under the interpretation by the majority, pe-
nalized less than the lender who has received no payment of usurious interest.
Although both lenders, under the statute, are to sustain a forfeiture of twice
the usurious interest, the lender who has obtained all or partial payment of the
interest is not required to refund such amount; therefore, in effect, his penalty
is offset by the interest payments received. Indeed, in instances where all the
interest has been paid by the borrower, one half (or fifty percent) of the legisla-
tively requiredfolfeiture is eliminated. Accordingly, borrowers are placed on
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In Texas International Mortgage Co. v. MP. Cnum Co.38 9 the Dallas
court of civil appeals held that if a lender requires as a condition of mak-
ing a loan that a certain portion of the proceeds of the loan be secured by a
certificate of deposit purchased from a third party bank, the amount of the
certificate of deposit is not to be deducted from the stated amount of the
loan in arriving at the true principal sum. The court considered whether
the lender derived any benefit from the certificate of deposit, other than
having it as security for the loan, and in this case, concluded that as long as
the borrower received interest on the certificate of deposit, the funds were
employed to the borrower's benefit.39°
The issue of the proper measure of damages, which prompted a divided
court in the Tanner case, was presented to the Fort Worth court of civil
appeals in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Chasteen.39 ' Without referring to
the Tanner case, the court held that the borrower was entitled to twice the
amount of interest contracted for, as if the borrower had defaulted in its
first installment, even though the borrower had paid ten months on the
particular loan.392
As a continuation of the prior holdings that a lender can require a
debtor to use a corporate form and also utilize individual guarantors in
complying with article 1302-2.09, 3 9 3 the case of Houston Furniture Dis-
tributors, Inc. v. Bank of Woodlake, NA. 39 4 held that the fact that the
lender required the use of an existing corporate form was not sufficient
summary judgment proof that the loan transaction was merely a subter-
fuge to evade the usury laws.3 95
The Texas Supreme Court clarified the element of "charging" interest
based upon its earlier holding in Windhorst v. Adcock Ppe & SupplY396 in
Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner.39 7 In Heaner, a suit on an open
account and a guaranty agreement, the vendor commenced charging inter-
est on the unpaid balance at the rate of twelve percent per annum thirty
days after the delivery of the merchandise. Although the individual guar-
antor had executed an agreement with the creditor, there was no proof
whether the corporate debtor had executed an agreement to pay more than
different footings depending on whether or not they have actually paid usuri-
ous interest.
563 S.W.2d at 578-79 (emphasis in original).
389. 564 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
390. Id. at 422. Compare Commerce Sav. Ass'n v. GGE Management Co., 539 S.W.2d
71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]), afdper curiam, 543 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. 1976)
(brokered deposits), with Moss v. Metropolitan Nat'i Bank, 533 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ) (compensating balances).
391. 565 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
392. Id. at 346.
393. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon 1963 & Pam. Supp. 1963-78).
394. 562 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
395. Id. at 883.
396. 547 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. 1977) (the supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed
the lower courts, holding that the "charging" of interest alone, without actual receipt of or
contract for, was sufficient under the statute to trigger usury penalties).
397. 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1979).
[Vol. 33
REAL PROPERTY
the statutory interest rate39'0n open accounts. With respect to the corpo-
rate debtor, the court affirmed the civil appeals' decision that held, absent
an agreement, the charging of any interest during the interest-free period
provided in the open account portion of article 5069-1.03, 399 is in excess
of double the amount allowed, that is, in excess of twice zero. For the
individual guarantor, the court held that article 5069-1.04,400 which per-
mits a maximum rate of ten percent per annum on written contracts gov-
erns the written guaranty.
The Windhorst case has been recently distinguished in Killebrew v. Bart-
lett,40 ' a suit on a sworn account. The printed form of invoice utilized by
the vendor contained language that stated that a 1-1/2% charge would be
made each month on the unpaid balances thirty days after purchase. Tes-
timony from the vendor indicated it did not intend to charge interest on
the account and that the company did not customarily charge any interest
on delinquent accounts. Further, the evidence showed that no interest was
ever added to the invoices sent to the purchaser and that no interest was
charged on the books of the vendor company. The court was of the opin-
ion that Windhorst was distinguishable on the facts because the creditor in
Killebrew did not actually add an amount for interest to the account nor
demand payment.402 The court also considered whether a pleading filed
by the creditor seeking usurious interest would be sufficient to constitute a
"charge" under the statute, but held there was no such charge here since
the debtor failed to offer into evidence the earlier pleading containing such
charge, such earlier pleading having been superseded by an amended peti-
tion.4°3
C. Mechanics'And Materialmen's Liens
1. Inception of the Lien
In the noteworthy case of Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D.
Blaylock General Contractor, Inc. ,4 the supreme court, in its opinion of
December 23, 1978, superseding its earlier opinion of July 26, 1978,405
dealt with a priority question between a general contractor and an interim
lender involving the construction of two motels, one in Fort Worth and
one in Irving. Although the facts were similar with respect to each tract of
land, the court discussed them separately since the transactions were sepa-
rate and certain critical facts were different in each case.
In connection with the Forth Worth property, on March 8, 1973, the
owner consummated the purchase of the property, and the interim lender
funded the purchase. The deed of trust was filed and recorded the follow-
398. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971).
399. Id.
400. Id. art. 5069-1.04.
401. 568 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
402. Id. at 917.
403. Id.
404. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 146 (Dec. 23, 1978).
405. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 521 (July 30, 1978).
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ing day, March 9, 1973. The proceeds from the financing were not used to
pay off any liens against the property at the time it was acquired. Prior to
this time, while the general contractor was still negotiating its construction
contract with the owner, the general contractor's subcontractors com-
menced to do certain preliminary on-site work involving engineering and
topographical surveying, staking of the property, preparing the property
for laying of the foundation, dirt work, and certain other specific items, as
detailed in the opinion. In a full and complete discussion of the provisions
of article 5459,406 concerning the question of actual commencement of
construction or the delivery of material, the court held that the inception of
the general contractor's mechanic's lien occurred after the recordation of
the deed of trust and was, therefore, junior and subordinate to the lender's
deed of trust lien and was thereby extinguished by the foreclosure of the
senior lien. Whereas the court of civil appeals had emphasized the visibil-
ity aspects of article 5459, the supreme court felt that not all acts of com-
mencement of construction or delivery of materials fell within the scope of
the statute simply by being "visible." In other words, to qualify as actual
commencement of construction of improvements, "something of perma-
nent value on the land, as opposed to preliminary or preparatory activities
or structures ' 4°7 will be required. On the other hand, in order for the de-
livery of materials to qualify, it must be material "which will be incorpo-
rated into the permanent structure or material which will be consumed or
used up during the construction of the permanent structure. '"408
With regard to the Irving property, the deed of trust was filed on April
13, 1973, and out of the proceeds of the initial funding, approximately
$109,000 was used to pay off a prior vendor's lien held on the land by a
third party bank, for which a release was obtained. The work performed
on the Irving property by the general contractor, however, was sufficient to
constitute the inception of its lien prior to the filing of the deed of trust.
Three aspects of the contractor's activities were sufficient, in the court's
opinion, to qualify either under the commencement of construction or the
delivery of material portion of the statute: (1) clearing, digging, and site
work; (2) delivery of concrete section pipe that was to be incorporated into
the permanent structure; and (3) the laying and excavation of a founda-
tion. Furthermore, it was decided that even though the contractor's lien
had its inception prior to the deed of trust filing, under the doctrine of
equitable subrogation the fact that the proceeds of the financing were used
406. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5459 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). The statute sets out
three events, the earliest of which establishes the time of inception of the lien: the recording
of a written contract, the recording of a prescribed affidavit if the contract is oral, or
[tihe actual commencement of construction of the improvements or the deliv-
ery of material to the land upon which the improvements are to be located for
use thereon for which the lien herein provided results, provided such com-
mencement or material is actually visible from inspection of the land upon
which the improvements are being made ....
Id.




to pay off a prior mortgage placed the lender in a superior position to the
extent of the funds advanced, namely $109,000. The priorities, therefore,
were determined to be, in order: the $109,000 prior vendor's lien funded
by the lender, followed by the general contractor's mechanic's lien, and
finally the balance due on the note secured by the deed of trust held by the
lender.'  Even though the foreclosure transferred the land itself free of all
liens, the court held that the general contractor's security interest was
transferred to the excess proceeds, and, since the lender bid in the land at
its own foreclosure sale, with no cash changing hands, the court awarded a
judgment for the general contractor against the lender for the unpaid
amount of its lien.4 °
The supreme court elaborated upon the decision in Irving Lumber Co. v.
Alltex Mortgage Co.,4 1' and adopted the view that a mechanic's lien "at-
taches to whatever legal or equitable interest the contracting party had
when the work was begun, and thereafter attaches to any other or greater
interest whenever acquired before the lien is enforced: provided that the
after-acquired title enlarges an estate or interest to which the lien has al-
ready become attached." 2
The holding in Irving Lumber Co. was applied by a federal court in
Development Design, Inc. v. Rainbow Development, Inc. 413 In this case the
contractor entered into a contract with a prospective landowner and, sub-
sequently, at the time the landowner obtained title, the lender advanced
the purchase money, which was secured by a deed of trust covering the
property. The court held that where the purchase money is funded and the
deed of trust is executed contemporaneously with the vesting of the title in
the landowner, the purchase money deed of trust lien is prior and superior
to the mechanic's lien without regard to the date of inception of the
mechanic's lien. 4  The court also distinguished Whirlpool41 5 on the basis
that the owner of the property in Whirlpool had acquired ownership prior
to the time any of the liens arose.46
An interesting issue involving the inception of a mechanic's lien cover-
ing fifteen different lots, based upon the delivery of materials to one of the
lots, was decided in First Continental Real Estate In vestment Trust v. Conti-
nental Steel Co.417 The court held that where the lots in a project were
treated as one property, the lien attached to all of the lots as of the first
409. Id. at 155.
410. Id.
411. 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971) (the court held that an oral contract with a prospective
owner does not give rise to a materialman's lien superior to a deed of trust given to secure
payment of purchase money, executed contemporaneously with the vesting of title in the
debtor; and further, that foreclosure of the superior lien will cut off any inferior lien).
412. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 153.
413. 444 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
414. Id. at 159.
415. First Nat'l Bank v. Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1974) (the materialman's
lien was given preference over prior recorded deed of trust where the improvements made
could be removed without material injury).
416. 444 F. Supp. at 159.
417. 569 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
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delivery of materials to any one of the lots. The court also held that equi-
table subrogation was an affirmative defense that must be proven by the
person relying upon it.4 8
2. Perfecting the Lien
In Robert Burns Concrete Contractors, Inc. v. Norman4" 9 the claimed
constitutional lien failed because the lien claimant, who had contracted
with the developer, could not establish that the developer ever held title to
the property. The statutory lien failed an as alternative claim since the lien
claimant had not given the owner the required statutory notice.42°
The importance of recognizing the distinction between an acknowledge-
ment and a jurat was exhibited in Dee's Cabinet Shop, Inc. v. Weber.42'
The instruments filed by the lien claimant and recorded by the county
clerk were acknowledged, but not sworn to or verified. Based on the argu-
ment that this was sufficient to give constructive notice to a subsequent
purchaser of the property, the court held that even though an instrument
may be recorded under article 6626,422 it does not necessarily give con-
structive notice, inasmuch as constructive notice would not exist but for
some statute permitting it, which in this case required a jurat.423 In Texas
Construction Associates v. Bali4 24 the court held that actual notice was not
sufficient to perfect a materialman's lien under article 5472(d), section
4(b)42 5 where the required statutory notice was absent.
3. Retainage Fund-Article 5469
The question of preference among various lien claimants in retainage
funds was before the court in Texas Crushed Stone Co. v. National Housing
Industries, Inc.426 Article 5469427 creates a preference in the retainage
fund for complying artisans and mechanics "who perform labor or serv-
ices" on the job. Here the court found there was sufficient evidence to
support a judgment; even though one of the claimants supplied only labor,
this was sufficient to entitle them to a preference.428
4. Extent of Lien/or Lost Profits
In an issue of apparent first impression in Texas the lien claimant in
Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Campbell Brothers429 contended that its statu-
tory lien should also extend to the amount of profit lost on the work not
418. Id. at 45.
419. 561 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
420. Id. at 618.
421. 562 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
422. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6626 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
423. 562 S.W.2d at 947-48.
424. 558 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
425. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5472d (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
426. 562 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
427. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Vernon 1978-79).
428. 562 S.W.2d at 919.
429. 569 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
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performed due to the breach of the contract by the owner. The court, in
rejecting this contention, held that, under article 5452,430 a profit is secured
by a statutory Lien only to the extent that it may be considered compensa-
tion for services actually rendered, as distinguished from the amount of the
lien claimant's loss due to the owner's breach of contract.43'
IV. LANDLORD AND TENANT
by
M. Marvin Katz*
A. Security Deposit Refunds
When a lease term expires article 5236e imposes an obligation upon a
residential landlord either to return the security deposit to the tenant or to
provide the tenant with a written description and itemized list of damages
and charges. 432 If neither is done within thirty days after the tenant sur-
renders the premises, provided the tenant has furnished landlord with a
written forwarding address,43 3such failure is prima facie evidence creating
a presumption that the landlord acted in bad faith.4 34 The statute provides
for penalties against a landlord who in bad faith either fails to refund a
security deposit435 or fails to provide a written description and itemized list
of charges deducted for damages above and beyond ordinary wear and
tear.436
Although the failure to act within thirty days creates a presumption of
bad faith on the part of the landlord, this presumption may be overcome.
Wilson v. O'Connord37 involved a suit for treble damages and other statu-
tory penalties by a former tenant against his former landlord for a bad
faith failure to timely return the security deposit. Although it was undis-
puted that the landlord had not returned the security deposit within thirty
days, evidence was introduced that the landlord had been out of the coun-
try during that period of time and had left no one in charge of the apart-
ments.438 The appeals court reversed the trial court's award of treble
430. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5452 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
431. 569 S.W.2d at 42.
* B.B.A., Texas A & M University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law,
De Lange, Hudspeth, Pitman & Katz, Houston, Texas.
432. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, §§ 2, 3 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
433. The landlord's obligation to refund the security deposit or to provide a written
description of damages and charges does not begin until the tenant furnishes a forwarding
address. Id. § 6(a). Failing to furnish a forwarding address does not forfeit tenant's right to
the refund. Id.
434. Id. § 4(c).
435. The landlord is liable for $100 plus treble the amount of deposit wrongfully with-
held, plus tenant's reasonable attorneys' fees in a suit to recover the deposit. Id. § 4(a).
436. The landlord "forfeits all rights to withhold any portion of the security deposit or to
bring suit against the tenant for damages to the premises and is liable to the tenant for
reasonable attorneys' fees in a lawsuit to recover the security deposit." Id. § 4(b).
437. 555 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
438. Id. at 778.
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damages because there had been no express finding of bad faith and re-
manded the case for a new trial on that issue.4 39 Although the statutory
presumption of bad faith exists, such presumption is rebuttable and since
the landlord presented evidence of a reasonable excuse for the delay, a fact
issue existed on the question of bad faith. Absent a finding of bad faith,
the statutory penalties are not appropriate."' The court stated the require-
ment of bad faith implies an intention on the part of the landlord to de-
prive the tenant of the refund lawfully due, that is, that the landlord must
have "acted in dishonest disregard" of the rights of the tenant." 1 Mere
noncompliance with the statute, even though intentional, does not estab-
lish the landlord's dishonest intention. The court indicated that the crucial
question was whether the landlord intended to retain the deposit dishon-
estly, knowing that he had no right to do so.44 Moreover, a finding of bad
faith is erroneous if the security deposit withheld by the landlord is less
than the amount of delinquent rental.443
In Thr fl v. Johnson 4 a rental contract clause providing forfeiture of the
security deposit for early termination was held unenforceable in absence of
proof of actual damages.445 A tenant sued under article 5236e to recover
statutory penalties and attorneys' fees under two separate leases covering
two different apartments for different periods, both of which were man-
aged by the same company. In each case the leases had been terminated
by the tenant prior to the expiration of the lease term. The first lease pro-
vided that upon early termination, even if the premises were relet without
loss to the landlord, the security deposit would nevertheless be forfeited.
The second lease contained a provision for early termination in the event
of a transfer of employment. With respect to tle first lease, the jury found
that the tenant had failed to give the required notice before he vacated the
premises, thus precluding a finding of bad faith retention by the land-
lord.' 6 Consequently, no statutory penalties were imposed. The court,
nevertheless, upheld plaintiffs recovery of the fifty dollar security deposit,
based on the jury's finding that, with immediate re-leasing of the apart-
ment to a new tenant, the landlord had incurred no loss of rentals, no
added efforts or inconvenience, and no administrative costs. The court
noted that section 2(a) of article 5236e recognizes the right of a landlord, if
authorized by a rental contract, to retain all or part of the security deposit
if a tenant fails to give the required advance notice of surrender. The
439. Id. at 782.
440. Id. at 780. See also Diamond Oaks Terrace Apartments v. Spraggins, 561 S.W.2d
612, 613 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
441. 555 S.W.2d at 780.
442. Id. at 781.
443. Daugherty v. Morales, 556 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
The portion of the judgment awarding damages for wrongful seizure of plaintiff's personal
property was affirmed, however, because most of the personal belongings seized were ex-
empt from any landlord's lien, and were not returned to tenant after demand. See TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236d, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
444. 561 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, no writ).
445. Id. at 869.
446. Id. at 866.
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court, however, construed section 2(a) in light of section 3(a) to require the
landlord to prove at trial that the tenant is legally liable for damages or
charges equal to or greater than the retained deposit, and the reasonable-
ness of those damages. In the absence of such proof, a forfeiture provision
amounts to a penalty and is unenforceable." 7
With regard to the second lease, the court upheld the jury's finding that
the landlord had retained the security deposit in bad faith. The finding of
bad faith was supported first by the unrebutted presumption arising from
the landlord's failure either to return the deposit or to provide a written
description of deductions within thirty days after termination of the lease.
In addition, two collection letters sent by the landlord supported the pre-
sumption of bad faith. The finding of bad faith was accompanied by a
finding that the tenant had substantially complied with the advance notice
provisions of the second lease, allowing the tenant to recover statutory
penalties and attorneys' fees as well as refund of the security deposit."'
In Hogg v. Jaeckle449 the court applied section 4(b) of article 5236e to
deny a landlord the right to withhold any portion of the security deposit or
to bring suit against the tenant for damages to the premises when the land-
lord had failed to furnish the written description and itemized list of dam-
ages within the required thirty-day period. Such failure also made the
landlord liable for the tenant's attorney's fee in a suit by the tenant to
recover the security deposit.450
A tenant, however, is obligated to furnish the landlord with a written
copy of tenant's forwarding address to obtain a refund of the security de-
posit.45' Such requirement is not met by an address printed on a rent
check delivered prior to the termination of the tenancy. 452 Failure to fur-
nish a forwarding address will not deprive the tenant of the right to re-
cover the security deposit if the address is later furnished.453 In La Voie v.
Kaplan454 the tenant testified that he gave his forwarding address orally to
the landlord's secretary and that she wrote it down on the ledger card. The
court expressly withheld a ruling on whether this method of notice consti-
tuted substantial compliance with the statute. 55
B. Construction of Lease Agreements
1. Renewal and Purchase Options
Although it is advisable to set forth in a clear and unambiguous manner
any provision pertaining to renewal or purchase options, the courts have
447. Id. at 869.
448. Id. at 868.
449. 561 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
450. Id. at 572.
451. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 6(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
452. Michaux v. Koebig, 555 S.W.2d 171, 175 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
453. LaVoie v. Kaplan, 556 S.W.2d 641, 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ dism'd
w.o.j.).
454. Id.
455. Id. at 643.
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continued to uphold such provisions whenever possible, even if they are
somewhat vague. When the original term specified both an aggregate
rental for a ten-year primary term and monthly rental payments, an option
to renew for five years "under the same terms and conditions" was held to
be clear and enforceable.456 An option to renew for "four one year peri-
ods" was similarly upheld as sufficiently certain to be enforceable on the
grounds that a general covenant to renew or extend a lease that is silent as
to the terms of the renewal or extension implies a renewal or extension
upon the same terms and conditions as are contained in the original
lease. 57
The rental terms of the original lease have also been applied to a hold-
over tenancy. In Turton v. Pyland458 the court held a tenant liable under a
month-to-month residential lease for one month's rental even though he
only occupied the premises for the first five days of the month before va-
cating. The court relied on the general rule that when a tenant holds over
after the expiration of the original term, the holding over constitutes a re-
newal of the lease for a term identical to the expired lease. Absent an
agreement to the contrary, the court will presume that a holdover tenant is
liable for the rent for a like period under the same terms as the original
lease so long as the lease period is one year or less.4 5
9
Most renewal provisions in leases require the tenant to notify the land-
lord of his election to exercise the option no later than a specified time
before the expiration of the primary term. The consequence of failing to
timely exercise the option was considered in Reynolds-Penland Co. v. Hex-
ter & Lobello.4 0 The lease in Reynolds-Penland provided for a five-year
renewal option to be exercised in writing at least nine months before the
end of the primary term. The tenant neglected to exercise the option
within the time specified. When the landlord advised the tenant two
months after the option deadline that the premises were to be vacated at
the end of the primary term, the tenant belatedly attempted to exercise the
renewal option, which the landlord refused to honor. Although the ten-
ant's leasing officer admitted that he had simply forgotten to exercise the
option within the required time, the tenant argued that, under equitable
principles, since the delay was slight and since the landlord suffered no
damage by the delay, the late exercise should nevertheless be deemed ef-
fective so as to avoid an undue hardship that would result to the tenant.46'
After carefully distinguishing other decisions462 in which equity had ex-
cused neglect in fulfilling a condition precedent of a lease, the court held in
456. Bellows v. Crow, 557 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ dism'd
w.o.j.).
457. Watley v. Vergott, 561 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
458. 567 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
459. Id. at 248.
460. 567 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ dism'd by agr.).
461. Id. at 239.
462. Sirtex Oil Indus., Inc. v. Erigan, 403 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1966); Jones v. Gibbs, 133
Tex. 627, 640-41, 130 S.W.2d 265, 272 (1939). The language in both cases that supported
excuse of the tenant's neglect under equity principles was distinguished by the court as dicta
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the landlord's favor, concluding that the neglect of the lessee barred the
interposition of equity to grant relief under these circumstances, and that
the common law rule that time is of the essence applied. The court rea-
soned that if the other view were adopted,
all contracts would be called into question as meaningless and uncer-
tain, dependent upon the whims of a panacean court or a jury. If
certainty of rights and obligations is the basic goal of contract law,
this goal would be frustrated by making every option contract the sub-
ject of equitable discretion by both court and jury. The absurdity of
such a rule is even more apparent where, as here, the contract is be-
tween experienced and sophisticated businessmen.463
2. Implied Warranty of Habitability
Kamarath v. Bennett4 64 established a new doctrine of implied warranty
of habitability in residential tenancies. In Kamarath the tenant occupied a
one-bedroom apartment under a month-to-month tenancy. Although he
had inspected the apartment prior to moving in, many of the defects were
not visible or then apparent.4 65 City inspectors later found several viola-
tions, none of which were corrected despite demand by the city to do so.
Thereafter, the landlord gave notice to the tenant to vacate. The tenant
stopped paying rent in June, claiming unhabitability as an excuse, but did
not vacate until September. After moving out, the tenant filed suit against
the landlord for damages alleging a breach of an implied warranty of hab-
itability.466
The trial court's judgment that the plaintiff take nothing was affirmed by
the Waco court of civil appeals on the basis that no such implied warranty
exists.467 Upon review, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the long-stand-
ing common law rule that, absent fraud or deceit, "there is no implied
warranty on the part of the lessor that premises leased for residential pur-
poses are suitable for their intended use."'4 68 The court based the implied
warranty of habitability upon three factors: Texas legislative policy au-
thorizing home rule cities to establish housing codes;4 69 the landlord's bet-
not essential to either decision. Reynolds-Penland Co. v. Hexter & Lobello, 567 S.W.2d 237,
240-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ dism'd by agr.).
463. Reynolds-Penland Co. v. Hexter & Lobello, 567 S.W.2d 237, 241-42 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1978, writ dism'd by agr.).
464. 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978), noted in 32 Sw. L. J. 1037 (1978). After the survey
period ended Tex. H.B. 1773 (1979) was passed by both houses and was sent to the Gover-
nor. If signed by the Governor, this law will control the landlord's duty to repair, substan-
tially altering the Kamarath rule.
465. Eg., ancient plumbing that burst, depriving the tenant of hot water, faulty electrical
wiring, and structural defects causing the bricks of the building to fall. 568 S.W.2d at 659.
466. Id.
467. Kamarath v. Bennett, 549 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977), rev'd, 568
S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978).
468. 568 S.W.2d at 659.
469. A copy of the Dallas city ordinance was not in the record, although an inspector's
testimony established the violations. The absence of the ordinance from the record forced
the court to employ circuitous reasoning in identifying the source of the public policy giving
rise to the implied warranty. "Judicial notice is not taken of municipal ordinances, but they
must not only be proven, but pleaded like other facts." State ex rel. Osborn v. City of
McAllen, 127 Tex. 63, 71, 91 S.W.2d 688, 692 (1936). Without the ordinance before them,
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ter position for discovery of latent defects; and the fairness of allocating
the costs of repairs to the landlord who has the advantage of superior bar-
gaining power and retained ownership. 7 °
The implied warranty identified by the court applies by operation of law
to the rental of residential dwelling units, whether for a specified term or at
will. Moreover, the warranty against defects in essential facilities extends
throughout the lease term, imposing a duty to repair not only the latent
defects in existence at the beginning of the lease but also those which sub-
sequently develop. 7 ' Breach of the implied warranty is a question of fact
involving several factors. 72 In particular the defect must be of such a na-
ture that it will "render the premises unsafe, or unsanitary, or otherwise
unfit for living therein.
473
Although the tenant's remedies for breach of the implied warranty were
not specifically discussed in the opinion, the court suggested in a footnote
that testimony as to the difference between the rent due under the lease
and the fair market rental of the property in its state of disrepair would be
clearly relevant to the issue of the tenant's damages. 474 The court ex-
pressly reserved judgment, however, on the questions of the proper meas-
ure of damages and the applicability of the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act.
4 7 5
The question of the validity of a tenant's waiver of the implied warranty
of habitability was not before the court, but the court strongly implied that
such a waiver would be upheld: "[Olur holding should not be construed to
mean that a tenant may not, by express agreement, waive the warranty of
habitability. 4
76
3. Assignment or Sublease
A question of lease construction pertaining to assignment and sublease
provisions was before the court in Houck v. Kroger Co. 477 The lease pro-
the court relied on the Texas statute that authorizes home rule cities to adopt ordinances
establishing minimum standards of habitation. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1175, § 35
(Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
470. 568 S.W.2d at 660.
471. "[The] implied warranty of habitability.., that the apartment is habitable and fit
for living ... means that at the inception of the rental lease there are no latent defects in the
facilities that are vital to the use of the premises for residential purposes and that these
essential facilities will remain in a condition which makes the property livable." Id. at 661.
472. The nature of the deficiency, its effect on habitability, the length of time for
which it persisted, the age of the structure, the amount of the rent, the area in
which the premises are located, whether the tenant waived the defects, and
whether the defects resulted from malicious, abnormal, or unusual use by the
tenant ....
Id. Alleged inadequacy of mail facilities was held not to be a breach of the implied war-
ranty of habitability in a companion case decided the same day. Johnson v. Highland Hills
Drive Apartments, 568 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1978).
473. 568 S.W.2d at 661.
474. Id. at 659 n.1.
475. Id. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
476. 568 S.W.2d at 660 n.2.
477. 555 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
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vided that if the tenant wanted to assign or sublease
it shall notify Landlord of the name of the proposed subtenant or as-
signee and of the general nature of the business which such subtenant
or assignee proposes to conduct. If the business which such subtenant
or assignee proposes to conduct would conflict with exclusive rights
granted in leases to other tenants, Landlord may, within ten (10) days
of receipt of such notice, refuse to approve such sublease or assign-
ment. If Landlord fails to approve such subtenant or assignee within
ten (10) days after receipt of such notice, or if Landlord refuses to
approve such subtenant or assignee for any other reason than that
permitted above, Tenant may terminate the Lease.478
The lease also contained the usual language that "[tihe provisions of this
Lease shall bind and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, their heirs,
executors, administrators, successors and assigns." '479
The original tenant, Kroger, gave notice to the landlord that it was sub-
leasing the premises to a subtenant who would use the space for a record
and tape outlet. Despite the landlord's refusal to consent, the tenant exe-
cuted the sublease. The landlord argued that the attempted sublease cre-
ated a default entitling him to terminate the principal lease. The tenant
contended that the quoted language granted a right to sublease or assign,
unless such assignment or sublease conflicted with the exclusive rights of
other tenants in the shopping center.48°
The court conceded that it was possible to interpret the above quoted
provisions in the lease to say that if there was no consent, the tenant's sole
remedy would be to terminate the lease.48" ' The court, however, found that
the permission to sublet having been granted in that the sublessee's busi-
ness created no conflict, the right of the tenant to do so could continue in
effect along with the right of termination given as an additional contrac-
tual remedy.482 The court further noted that the lease term purporting to
bind "successors and assigns" imported a right in the tenant to sublease.48 3
Since the parties were before the court on a temporary injunction, no final
determination was made as to the construction of the quoted language, but
the subtenant was permitted to remain in possession to maintain the status
quo pending final litigation.484
4. Miscellaneous Lease Provisions
In Wilson v. BoyaP8 5 the court construed a lease for property to be used
as a grain elevator and a storage and fertilizer business. The tenant's quar-
478. Id. at 804.
479. Id.
480. Id. at 805.
481. The court's language is confusing on this point: "The provision in the lease that in
the event the landlord fails to approve the subtenant for any reason other than the single
reason expressly permitted '[t]enant may terminate the lease', affords the basis for argument
that it constitutes the landlord's [sic] exclusive remedy." Id. at 805-06.
482. Id. at 806.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 806.
485. 556 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, no writ).
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terly rental payments were often late, but nevertheless accepted by land-
lord. On October 24, the tenant received a letter from the landlord that
since the rental due on October 1 had not been paid, the lease was termi-
nated. There was no provision in the lease for notice of default and oppor-
tunity to cure.486 In addition to the late rental, the landlord argued that
there were two other reasons why he should prevail. First, because the
evidence established that the tenant did not have the proper license and
bond487 for the grain elevator, the lease should be unenforceable and void.
Second, since the tenant was unlicensed, he was operating illegally thereby
enabling landlord to terminate the lease.488
Refuting each of the landlord's arguments, the court held the lease en-
forceable. As to the late rental payment, the court applied principles of
waiver and held that since landlord had regularly accepted late payments,
he could not change his procedure without first notifying tenant that he
intended to do so.489 In order to determine the effect of the lack of license
and bond, the court said that it was first necessary to determine the intent
of the regulatory statute by seeing who or what is to be regulated and pro-
tected. Since this statute was for the protection of the depositor of grain,
and because the landlord did not fall within this category, the landlord
could not cancel the lease for such violation.49" The court also rejected the
landlord's argument based upon the illegality of the tenant's operations
because the lease contained no express provision for forfeiture if the prem-
ises were used for an illegal purpose.49' At common law, a lessee does not
forfeit his lease by using the premises for illegal purposes in the absence of
a provision in the lease contract permitting a forfeiture in such cases.
In Meyerland Co. v. Palais Royal, Inc. 492 the court held that sign limita-
tions in leases must be specific in order to be enforceable. In this case the
lease agreement provided that signs erected by the lessee "shall conform to
the sign criteria hereinafter set forth and that such signs shall conform with
the standards set by the lessor or the shopping center as a whole."'4 93 Since
none of the criteria related to size limitations, no injunction was granted
against the tenant for erecting a sign with letters eleven feet high.494
In Hart v. Keller Properties495 the lease provided that after the expira-
tion of the lease term, the tenant would be a tenant at sufference at an
agreed rental of three times the normal rental rate for the period the tenant
withheld possession. The tenant failed to vacate at the end of the term,
486. Id. at 123. There was an express provision, however, providing for automatic termi-
nation without notice if payments were late. Id.
487. See Texas Grain Warehouse Act, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art, 5577b (Vernon
Supp. 1978-79).
488. 556 S.W.2d at 124.
489. Id. at 123.
490. Id. at 124.
491. Id. at 125.
492. 557 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.) 1977, no writ).
493. Id. at 535.
494. Id.
495. 567 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
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and the landlord sued in forcible detainer. The judgment for the landlord
was affirmed by the county court at law, which also granted a judgment for
three times the usual rental, as provided for in the lease.49 6 In reversing
the damage award, the Dallas court of civil appeals stated that the correct
measure of a landlord's damages when a tenant withholds possession
pending appeal of a forcible detainer action is the reasonable rental value
for that period.497 The court said:
We recognize that the parties to a contract may make provision for
liquidated damages in the event of a breach when actual damages are
difficult to determine and the amount agreed on is a reasonable fore-
cast of just compensation. . . .Lessor, however, does not seek to jus-
tify the treble-damage provision on this basis. In both his pleading in
the trial court and his brief in this court he frankly characterizes it as a
penalty. As such, it cannot prevail over the legal measure of dam-
ages.
C. Landlord's Tort Liability
Notwithstanding the implied warranty of habitability in residential
leases, decisions involving landlords' tort liability for personal injuries to
tenants and their invitees or guests have recognized recovery only upon a
showing of the landlord's negligence and have denied recovery under strict
liability theories.
In Parker v. Highland Park, Inc. 499 the Texas Supreme Court abolished
the long-standing "no duty" doctrine, which prevented an occupier of
property from being held liable for injuries to an invitee resulting from
dangerous conditions that were "open and obvious." 5" The court adopted
sections 3605"1 and 361502 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and ruled
496. Id. at 888.
497. Id. at 889; see Stewart v. Breese, 367 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963,
no writ). In a footnote the court acknowledged the changed language in rule 752 of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure: "Damages may include but are not limited to loss of rentals
during the pendency of the appeal .. " TEX. R. Civ. P. 752 (emphasis added). The court
construed the amendment to the rule as making no change in the measurement of damages
under substantive law. Hart v. Keller Properties, 567 S.W.2d 888, 889 n. I (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1978, no writ).
498. Hart v. Keller Properties, 567 S.W.2d 888, 889 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no
writ).
499. 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978).
500. The traditional "no duty" rule provided:
[If there are open and obvious dangers of which the invitees know, or of
which they are charged with knowledge, then the occupier owes them "no
duty" to warn or to protect the invitees. This is so ... because there is "no
duty" to warn a person of things he already knows, or of dangerous conditions
or activities which are so open and obvious that as a matter of law he will be
charged with knowledge and appreciation thereof.
Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 378 (Tex. 1963).
501. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 360 (1965):
Parts of Land Retained in Lessor's Control Which Lessee is Entitled to Use
A possessor of land who leases a part thereof and retains in his own control
any other part which the lessee is entitled to use as appurtenant to the part
leased to him, is subject to liability to his lessee and others lawfully upon the
land with the consent of the lessee or a sublessee for physical harm caused by
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that a lessor has a duty to the guest of a tenant to remove discoverable
dangerous conditions on the common areas retained by the lessor. Parker
involved an injury to an apartment tenant's guest when she fell on an un-
lighted common stairway. Knowing the stairs were dark, the tenant and
guest had tried to navigate the descent by flashlight. The jury found that
the landlord was negligent and found that the plaintiff was not contribu-
torily negligent.5 °3 Applying the "no duty" doctrine, however, the trial
court held for the landlord. Under the "no duty" doctrine, an occupier of
land has no duty to warn a person of a dangerous condition of which the
person is aware. In reversing the trial court's judgment, the Texas
Supreme Court abolished the "no duty" concept and held that henceforth
in the trial of all actions based on a lessor's negligence for a dangerous
condition, "the reasonableness of an actor's conduct under the circum-
stances will be determined under principles of contributory negligence."5
Parker's new rule requiring lessors to remove dangerous conditions
from common areas under their retained control was applied in Jones v.
Houston Aristocrat Apartments, Ltd.505 to find against the landlord, despite
an exculpatory provision in the lease. In Jones a tenant sued the landlord
for damages for personal injuries resulting from a fall in her apartment.
Before signing the lease agreement, the tenant had noticed a hole in the
floor when she inspected the apartment. Although the landlord's agent
had agreed to repair the hole, this was not done. Some months later, the
tenant fell and broke her foot when she stepped in the hole while running
to report a fire in the apartment bathroom. The lease agreement contained
disclaimer provisions which acknowledged that the premises had been sat-
isfactorily completed, were in a tenantable condition, and had been in-
spected and approved by the tenant. The court rejected these disclaimer
provisions as "contrary to public policy and void insofar as they serve to
insulate the landlord from liability for his negligent failure to repair a
known dangerous condition."50 6 Moreover, because the landlord retained
a dangerous condition upon that part of the land retained in the lessor's con-
trol, if the lessor by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered the
condition and the unreasonable risk involved therein and could have made
the condition safe.
502. Id §361:
Parts of Land Retained in Lessor's Control but Necessary to Safe Use of Part
Leased
A possessor of land who leases a part thereof and retains in his own control
any other part which is necessary to the safe use of the leased part, is subject to
liability to his lessee and others lawfully upon the land with the consent of the
lessee or a sublessee for physical harm caused by a dangerous condition upon
that part of the land retained in the lessor's control, if the lessor by the exercise
of reasonable care
(a) could have discovered the condition and the risk involved, and
(b) could have made the condition safe.
503. The case arose before the effective date of the comparative negligence statute. TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
504. 565 S.W.2d at 517.
505. 572 S.W.2d I (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1978, no writ).
506. Id. at 3 (citing Crowell v. Housing Auth., 495 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1973)). It is unclear
whether this disapproval of exculpatory clauses can be reconciled with the apparent ap-
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control of the leased premises, it was charged with the duty of maintaining
them. The court based its finding of the landlord's retained control upon
two considerations. First, the lease itself prohibited the tenant from mak-
ing alterations or improvements to the apartment without the landlord's
consent, while the landlord retained the right to enter the apartment to
make repairs. Second, the court reasoned that the flooring of a second
story apartment was comparable to a partition wall because the floor also
served as the ceiling of the apartment below. Thus, because the landlord
knew or should have known of the defect in a part of the property over
which it retained control, the landlord was liable for the resulting inju-
ries. 507
Despite landlords' liability for discoverable dangerous conditions and
breaches of the implied warranty of habitability, courts have refused to
hold landlords liable for personal injuries under strict liability theories. In
Morris v. Kaylor Engineering Co.5° s recovery was denied against a land-
lord for injuries sustained when a tenant stepped on a swimming pool
skimmer cover and fell. The jury found no negligence on the part of the
landlord. In responding to the tenant's argument that recovery should be
granted based upon the warranty of habitability (strict liability) the court
said:
The warranty of habitability does not apply to the landlord-tenant
relationship in a personal injury case, and, as a consequence, appel-
lant's point of error is overruled. We recognize that the habitability
warranty has been extended to the sale of a new house. . . . We also
note that the Supreme Court has granted a writ in a case which may
shed light on this question. Kamarath v. Bennet ..... However, the
most recent directive from the Supreme Court clearly indicated that,
in a landlord-tenant personal injury action dealing with land appurte-
nant to the part leased to the lessee and under the control of the lessor,
the landlord's liability is based on negligence. The court in . . .
Parker v. Highland Park, Inc. . . . gave express recognition to the
restatement [(Second) of Torts § 360] ....
In Edwards v. Nee/y Oil, Inc. 510 recovery was denied against a sublessor
for an invitee's death resulting from an explosion in the leased premises.
The court found that the defective heater causing the explosion had under-
gone substantial modifications after the sublease, thus relieving the subles-
sor from liability. 5t '
Landlords' liability for intentional torts has also been the subject of liti-
gation during the survey period. Recovery was allowed against a landlord
proval of waivers of the implied warranty of habitability in Kamarath v. Bennett, 568
S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978). See notes 464-76 supra and accompanying text.
507. 572 S.W.2d at 3.
508. 565 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.). The
case was decided the same day the Texas Supreme Court rendered its decision in Kamarath
v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978). See notes 464-76 supra and accompanying text.
509. 565 S.W.2d at 334-35 (italicized language was printed in advance sheet but omitted
in official reporter); see note 501 supra.
510. 556 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
511. Id. at 115.
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for an intentional tort in Clark v. Sumner.5"' In this case because the ten-
ant's dog disturbed the neighbors, the apartment manager asked the tenant
to move and then turned off the electricity that controlled the heat to the
apartment. Since the weather was cold, the tenant took her children to her
mother's house for the night, leaving her dog on the patio adjoining the
apartment. During the tenant's absence, someone let the dog into the
apartment, and it caused $1,735 worth of damage to the tenant's property.
The jury found that the manager had let the dog into the apartment. Be-
cause the lease provided that the tenant would have quiet use and posses-
sion of the leased premises during the lease term, actual damages were
allowed against the landlord.513 In addition, punitive damages were al-
lowed since the tenant had pleaded and proved not only a contractual
cause of action but also an intentional trespass.5 14 In contrast, punitive
damages were not allowed in Beam v. Voss, 15 a case involving damages
for an improper restraining order denying a tenant's possession for three
days and conversion of his property at the end of the lease term. The court
held that no punitive damages are recoverable for wrongfully suing out a
writ of injunction, no matter how improper or malicious the motive.51 6
D. Eviction
In recent years, there has been a trend toward organizing tenants in
apartment projects in order to exert more pressure on landlords to upgrade
conditions. Until recently, absent a written lease providing for a longer
term, a landlord was able to evict any tenant with or without cause at the
end of the lease term. This right was severely impaired by the recent deci-
sion in Sims v. Century Kiest Apartments,5t7 the first Texas case in which
the concept of retaliatory eviction was considered.
In Sims the tenant had been a week-to-week tenant in the landlord's
apartments for nine years under an oral lease. Since the apartments were
deteriorating badly, the plaintiff organized a tenant's council, made many
complaints to the management, and finally reported violations of housing,
building, and health codes to city authorities. Although his rent was paid
in full and he continued to tender rental payments, he received a written
notice from landlord to vacate the apartment. The landlord filed a forcible
detainer suit and recovered possession, after which the tenant sued for
damages for retaliatory eviction, alleging that the eviction was retaliation
for reporting the violations.5s 8 In granting summary judgment for the
landlord, the trial court held that the landlord had an absolute right to
terminate the tenancy on proper notice at the end of any week and that its
512. 559 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
513. Id. at 915.
514. Id. at 916.
515. 568 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
516. Id. at 422.
517. 567 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
518. Id. at 520.
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motive in so doing did not give rise to an action for damages.5" 9
The Dallas court of civil appeals, in reversing the lower court, discussed
similar decisions from other jurisdictions,52°including both the constitu-
tional and public policy arguments and the statutory bases for refusing to
permit a retaliatory eviction. Although the tenant had alleged that the re-
taliatory eviction had infringed his first amendment rights, the court iden-
tified the public policy to encourage the reporting of violations of state and
local laws and ordinances52' as the basis of the cause of action. The court
held:
We conclude that the tenant has a legal right to be free of interference
with his reporting ,of violations of laws enacted for his benefit and that
the landlord has a correlative duty not to interfere with the tenant's
exercise of that right. If the tenant had no such right, the public pol-
icy to encourage reports of violation of the law would be substantially
frustrated. Accordingly, although the landlord may have the legal
power to terminate the tenancy, m our opinion the law recognizes no
legal right to do so for the sole purpose of retaliation when otherwise
he would have permitted the tenant to continue his tenancy. On this
basis, we hold that retaliatory eviction is a legal wrong for which an
action for damages will lie.522
The court expressly narrowed its holding by leaving open the question
whether a cause of action for retaliatory eviction could be based upon the
public policy against interference with the exercise of constitutional rights
of free speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of
grievances. The court also refused to hold that retaliatory eviction is a
"prima facie tort" based simply on harm intentionally caused without
,,523
"justification or excuse.
The damages sought by the tenant included his moving expenses, the
additional rent for a comparable apartment, damages for deprivation of
his first amendment rights, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. The
court expressly reserved judgment on which, if any, of these alleged dam-
ages would be recoverable if the tenant successfully proved retaliatory
eviction.121Significantly, the court did not decide whether retaliatory eviction is a
519. Id.
520. Id. at 528-30; see, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 753 (1971). All the cases
cited by the court utilized retaliatory eviction as an equitable defense to a forcible detainer
action, not as a basis for damages. One jurisdiction has denied punitive damages for retalia-
tory eviction. 401 Boardwalk Corp. v. Gutzwiller, 82 Misc. 2d 84, 368 N.Y.S.2d 122, 125-26
(Long Beach City Ct. 1975).
521. The Dallas housing ordinance, the source here of the public policy against retalia-
tory eviction, was not pleaded by the tenant. Because the issue arose on a motion for sum-
mary judgment, however, the court presumed "that the petition could have been amended to
include specific allegations of the ordinances alleged to have been violated," and held that
the defendant, as moving party, had the burden to produce the ordinances if they did not
sup ort the tenant's allegations. 567 S.W.2d at 530-31; see note 469 supra.
52. Id. at 532.
523. Id.
524. Id. at 532-33.
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defense to a forcible detainer suit. The opinion implied that it should not
be because as a summary remedy, the forcible detainer suit should be kept
simple, and because the tenant's cause of action for damages would sur-
vive a judgment for the landlord in the detainer action. 25
In another eviction case a court denied recovery of unused rental pay-
ments sought on a constructive eviction theory when the tenants had been
in violation of the written rental agreement. The court held that "mere
notice to quit, followed by peaceful vacation of the premises, is not suffi-
cient to constitute a claim of constructive eviction."
525. Id. at 532.
526. Michaux v. Koebig, 555 S.W.2d 171, 177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
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